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ABSTRACT
What is the impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on U.S. Army senior officer
forecasting accuracy and how does this forecasting ability shape success in battle? Military
leaders plan operations based on the forecasted strengths and vulnerabilities of their adversary.
Negative habits, such as limited option development, confirmation bias, doctrinal overreliance,
and over-consideration of sunk costs, inhibit effective forecasting. The tempo of the modern
battlefield, hierarchical culture, and institutional tendencies of the US Army may promote and
reinforce these habits. I surveyed Colonels in US Army War College programs to measure their
individual tendencies, levels of education, and accuracy in forecasting events during a three to
twelve-month future. Quantitative analysis of the resulting data shows that these habits are
present and negatively affect forecasting ability; additionally, higher levels of education
positively affect forecast accuracy, possibly counteracting the effects of negative institutional
tendencies and habits. Extending the research using historical and contemporary case studies of
senior US Army Generals, including interviews of General David Petraeus and other highranking officials, I find that rejection of these institutional habits and tendencies enabled superior
forecasting, leading to battlefield success. I conclude by examining how educational levels of
commanding generals in the Iraq War affected military success. Exploratory quantitative
analysis of data collected from the US Army historical archives shows that higher levels of
education positively affected significant activities within the general’s assigned areas.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
What is the impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on US military officer
forecasting accuracy and how does this forecasting ability shape success in battle? Individuals
and organizations use forecasts to make “an estimation of future situation…[and] an objective
assessment of a future course of action” (Bhatia 2019:1); thus they assess what the future
environment will be, as well as how a course(s) of action, if pursued, will unfold in that
environment. Effective forecasting is important in all aspects of defense matters. Forecasting is
part of the bureaucratic defense procurement processes, in which a state seeks to research,
develop, and field equipment that to allow it to fight effectively in a future environment. It is a
key component in campaign and battle plan development at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels. As a battle unfolds, military leaders should continue to refine forecasts of
enemy and friendly actions and adjust their actions accordingly to be successful.
Unfortunately, most individual, including military leaders, are not effective forecasters.
Effective forecasters acknowledge gaps in knowledge, conduct personal research to enables them
to make educated predictions, and use logical processes to arrive at reasonable conclusions
(Tetlock 2005, Tetlock and Gardner 2015). Contrarily, negative habits, such as limited option
development, confirmation bias, doctrinal overreliance, and over-consideration of sunk costs,
inhibit effective forecasting. The tempo of the modern battlefield, hierarchical culture, and
institutional tendencies of the US military may promote and reinforce these negative habits.
Military leaders, such as senior commissioned officers with 20 or more years of service, are
especially prone to these institutional habits and tendencies and thus negatively affected by them.
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This dissertation examines the effect of military institutional tendencies and habits on
military officer forecasting abilities, how attendant success/failure in forecasting affects combat
outcomes, and if increased education counteracts these institutional tendencies and habits, thus
improving success in war. This dissertation is organized in five chapters, with the bulk of
research organized into chapters two through four. The three primary research chapters are
stand-alone articles that each contain their own literature review, theory, research design,
analysis, findings and conclusions. To ensure academic rigor, this dissertation uses a mixture
of research methods, involving both quantitative analysis of survey and dataset material as well
as qualitative case study analysis, based upon archival and interview materials.
Chapter two, titled the Impact of Military Institutional Tendencies and Habits on
Forecasting examines the US Army as an institution, what tendencies and habits are promoted
within this institution, and what effect do these habits have on forecasting. I surveyed Colonels
in US Army War College programs to measure their individual tendencies, levels of education,
and accuracy in forecasting events during a three to twelve-month future. Quantitative analysis
of the resulting data shows that these tendencies and habits are present and negatively affect
forecasting ability; additionally, higher levels of education positively affect forecast accuracy,
possibly counteracting the effects of negative institutional tendencies and habits.
Chapter three, titled Senior General Officer Case Study, extends this research through
historical and contemporary case studies of senior US Army Generals, including General
McClellan in the American Civil War, General Omar Bradley in World War Two and General
David Petraeus during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Through these case studies, I confirm that
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rejection of these institutional habits and tendencies enabled superior forecasting, leading to
battlefield success.
Chapter four, titled Education and Success in Battle, examines if higher levels of
education positively affect forecast accuracy, possibly counteracting the effects of negative
institutional tendencies and habits. Using quantitative analysis of data collected from the US
Army historical archives I find that higher levels of education positively affected significant
activities within the general’s assigned areas.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE IMPACT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL TENDENCIES AND
HABITS ON FORECASTING
When things go wrong it is natural to blame leaders, reasoning that things
would have gone better if they had made better decisions. This is especially
true when senior leader decisions are controversial, as was the case with
Iraq. As commentators often note, Iraq was a war of choice that should not
have been initiated without being prepared for all likely developments,
especially postwar lawlessness. It also is understandable that poor outcomes
are often linked to common decision-making errors such as erroneous
assumptions, improper analogies, tunnel vision, and cognitive dissonance.
Almost by definition when things go badly, these types of limitations are in
play to some extent.
(Hooker and Collins 2015)

Most military decisions are based upon forecasts. In the military, individuals and
organizations use forecasts to make “an estimation of future situation…[and] an objective
assessment of a future course of action” (Bhatia 2019:1). Military planners forecast potential
adversaries and adversarial capabilities to allow friendly forces to develop equipment, tactics,
and overall capabilities, which can counter the advantages of a challenger. Thus, successful
forecasting can allow a military force to operate from a position of relative advantage to its
competitor. Historically, the United States’ military has had mixed success in correctly
forecasting the identity of its next adversary, organizing itself for warfare, and fighting in the
most appropriate way. At the outbreak of the Korean War, 1-21 Infantry, (Task Force Smith), a
poorly trained and equipped infantry battalion hastily deployed from constabulary duty in Japan,
failed to stop North Korea attacks from the north. Only through retraining and the deployment
of significant ground, air, and sea forces was the US able to stop, and then push back the North
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Korean invasion (Millett 2010). Prior to the Vietnam War, US policymakers and military
planners focused primarily on forecasting and organizing to fight against conventional Soviet
and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe (DeBiase 2017). This failure to effectively forecast
Vietnamese insurgent capabilities and US counterinsurgency requirements ultimately led to US
failure in the Vietnam War (Krepinevich Jr 2009). US forecasting for conventional conflict in
Europe later proved serendipitous when US and coalition forces routed Iraqi forces in the 1991
conflict of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Iraqi forces predominately employed
obsolete Soviet equipment and tactics, making them easy targets for the high tech US military
(Atkinson 1993). Following 9-11, the US achieved stunning victories in the opening phases of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to forecast the changing nature of the conflict
toward insurgencies once conventional operations ceased (Perliger and Sweeney 2018). This
most recent failure resulted in sustained conflicts that cost trillions of dollars and thousands of
American lives (Shane 2018).
Forecasting is difficult; accurate ex-ante predictions stand in “stark contrast” to easier expost analysis (Frühling 2006:21). Clausewitz (1976:25) addressed the challenges of forecasting
when he wrote
This uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, this continual interposition
of chance, the actor in war constantly finds things different from his
expectations; and this cannot fail to have an influence on his plans.
A commander must continually reassess his actions against the ever-changing situation in which
he and his army are involved. Reinforcing Clausewitz’s theory, researchers of complexity theory
describe history simply as “a succession of chaotic shocks reverberating through
incomprehensibly intricate networks” and thus non-predictable (Bak and Chen 1991:46-53).
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Counterintuitively, expertise in the area being predicted generally does not improve predictive
ability in it. More often than not expertise evokes hubris, misplaced confidence and
decisiveness, that limits the self-critical and reflective judgement required for better-thanaverage forecasting (Tetlock and Lebow 2001:23). Although we must admit it is never possible
to predict events with absolute certainty, this should not be used as justification for not
forecasting, nor for excusing consistently bad forecasts. Forecasts allow us to evaluate potential
futures; identifying and remedying causes of inaccuracy allows more-informed decisions with
higher chances of success.
Knowing the challenges of forecasting and the cost of getting them wrong, this research
examines the forecasting ability of military decision-makers. Military officers can be negatively
and positively influenced in their forecasts and subsequent decisions not only by individual
tendencies, but also by military institutional tendencies and habits. In undertaking this research,
I use quantitative research methods to answer my substantive research question: what is the
impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on US Army senior officer forecasting
accuracy?

Examination of Relevant Research
Although forecasting is generally defined as methods to infer future action (Tetlock
2005), the disciplinary approaches to thinking about forecasting differ significantly, including
both individual and institutional differences as well as economic, political and mixed method
perspectives. Forecasting is relevant to both natural and human sciences (Mazlish 2017), though
in this research I focus exclusively upon the latter. Even in these sciences that focus solely on
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human behavior, the attendant scientists and researchers all view forecasting through divergent
academic lenses.

Disciplinary Perspectives
Economists pioneered forecasting efforts to predict future market fluctuations and enable
informed investment and budgeting procedures (Diebold 1997, Hawkins 2005, Friedman 2013).
Most economists use macroeconomic models to represent the complex interaction of consumers,
producers, investors, and others in state and international economies (Amisano, Geweke et al.
2017). Individual actor attributes are generally not considered since the focus is on the economic
system. Economists have focused significant effort on political risk forecasting- a discipline that
attempts to foresee hazards of political actions by host government and foreign opposition
groups on international businesses’ foreign ventures (Bunn and Mustafaoglu 1978, De La Torre
and Neckar 1988, Goldstone, Bates et al. 2010). This disciplinary perspective is generally
limited in its application to my research due to its focus on economic facets of society. To
consider those societal factors as part of a forecasting effort, one must consider other disciplines.
Political scientists and international relations theorists also attempt to develop forecasts.
Political scientists strive to forecast government and politics events at the local through
international levels (Almond and Politics 1988). Scientists focused on international relations
attempt to forecast conflict or other human disasters (Schneider, Gleditsch et al. 2011).
Most social scientists acknowledge the difficulty of developing completely accurate
models, a prime example being the failure of Robert S. McNamara’s system-analysis and costbenefit predictions of North Vietnamese failure during the Vietnam War (DeLeon 1987). This
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model predicted that aggressive actions by US and South Vietnamese forces would incur
mounting losses on Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese army (NVA) forces, eventually
exhausting North Vietnam by 1968. As a result, the US pursued a strategy of attrition and
massive firepower, with progress measured by enemy body counts. Unfortunately, the model
incorrectly misjudged North Vietnamese will; VC and NVA forces continued fighting past 1968,
through the US withdrawal in 1973, until they captured Saigon in 1975 (Rejeski and Olson
2006:17). McNamara admitted the complete failure of this forecast, and the devastation it caused
to American lives and civil society (McNamara and VanDeMark 1996, McNamara 2003).
Challenges such as strategic interactions, moral hazards, self-fulfilling and self-denying
prophecies, selection effects, and other phenomena create complex systems that cannot be
understood simply by examining each of its separate parts (Jervis 1998, George, Bennett et al.
2005: 130). Out of this complexity emerged theories such as balance of power, which forecasts
alliances in responses to an aspiring world dictator (Jervis 1998). Since the discipline is diverse,
social scientists use a wide variety of methods to test their theories. Both qualitative and
quantitative methods to determine tendencies of causality are generally accepted.
Psychologists attempt to forecast individual human and group decisions by several means
including laboratory, field experiments, and case study methods to determine correlation
between variables (McLeod 2003). Cognitive psychologists have shown that individuals “rely
heavily upon our prior beliefs to help [them] interpret new information and make sense of our
ambiguous world” (Welch 2005: 37). Cognitive psychology scholars generally agree that
humans think irrationally, relying upon “inaccurate problem-solving procedures learned through
experience, trial and error, peers or parents, deliberate instruction” heuristics instead of rational
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choice decision-making processes (Hastie and Dawes 2010:17, 88). Motivational psychologists
theorize people forecast and make decisions based on basic needs (Hull 1943). These
disciplinary perspectives, while useful in showing the human tendency toward irrational forecast
and decision-making methodologies, are limited to the individual level, and do little to explain
phenomena such as state and international organizational forecast-based decisions.
Other research uses multidisciplinary approaches to make up for the individualdisciplinary weaknesses when explaining forecasting and decisions, especially for complex
scenarios, such as war. The remainder of this literature review first examines multidisciplinary
forecasting research, next considers forecasting as part of the decision-making process, and then
examines how institutional tendencies and habits affect forecasting and decision-making.

Multidisciplinary Application to State Policy
Forecasting is important to policymakers at the strategic level. At the state and
international level, Frühling (2006) examined the importance of forecasting in the development
of strategy linking a state’s military actions and political objectives. Often, state leaders forecast
the cause-effect relationship between potential military action and political success based upon
previous experience in war. Unfortunately, history never exactly repeats. (Frühling 2006).
Adding to research which examines the challenges of forecasting, Taleb (2010) examines the
impact of “black swans,” events that are outliers, and often considered ex ante as missed signals.
Examples of contemporary black swan events include the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
attacks of 9-11.
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Another cause of missed signals is the Fischoff tendency, or hindsight bias, in which one
assumes that an action will unfold similar to how actions have unfolded in the past (Fischhoff
1975, Hastie and Dawes 2010:33). An example of this was Israel’s failure to forecast the Arab
surprise attacks of the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Rabinovich 2007). This failure was due to
hindsight bias toward the results of the 1967 Six-Day War, and faulty assumptions subsequently
developed during the War of Attrition (1967-1970) (Klein, Hegarty et al. 2017).
Obviously, state organizations are interested in finding ways to improve the forecasting
ability of its military, security, and political apparatus. Improving forecasts can provide security
by allowing the state to develop equipment, tactics, and overall capabilities to counter the
advantages of a challenger. I follow now with research that examines detriments or benefits to
forecasting.
At the individual level, Reiber (2004), examines intelligence analyst forecasts and finds
“outcome feedback,” or rapid feedback of a predictor’s accuracy, does not ensure increased
judgment about probabilities. Instead “calibration feedback,” which depicts a combined overall
trend comparing predictions to outcomes is more likely to improve accuracy in the analyst’s
forecasting. Other research suggests that a personality trait of “openness” prevents biased
judgments in intelligence analysis (Bar‐ Joseph and McDermott 2008). This research, while
valuable from a micro-perspective of intelligence analysis, does little to explain effective
forecasting techniques for a greater public audience.
Tetlock (2005) attempts to remedy this when he combines economic, historical,
psychological, and political science techniques over a multi-year (1992-2003) research program
to identify the personal attributes of superior forecasters. He finds that “foxes,” those with wide
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ranging experience and multidisciplinary education tend to forecast more effectively than
“hedgehogs,” those with specialized experiences and single-disciplinary education (Tetlock and
Lebow 2001). More specifically, superior forecasters tend to be more self-critical, appreciative
of complexity, willing to revise estimates, and willing to admit when they are wrong. Poor
forecasters are doctrinal in their approach, seeking simplistic patterns. They also tend to be vain,
overconfident and willing to make bold prediction and suffer from both self-attribution bias and
hindsight bias (Tetlock 2005). He later finds (2015) some individuals are innately
“superforecasters” when compared to others. These individuals, though smart, are not geniuses.
Superforecasting results from gathering evidence from multiple sources, working in teams, using
probabilistic methodologies, and changing predictions based upon emerging evidence. He
further found these traits could be enhanced with focused training. Tetlock’s research
methodology consisted of surveys in which respondents provided demographic information and
answered questions to establish their personal psychological tendencies (such as need for
closure, tolerance for ambiguity, and willingness to consider alternate views). Respondents then
made multiple short and long-term forecasts, indicating not only whether an event was likely to
occur or not, but also the confidence they had in the forecast (Tetlock 2005:243-245). Tetlock
analyzed the resulting data to ascertain traits of those who forecasted more accurately than
others.

The US Military and Forecasting
Forecasting is an integral part of US strategy process. Colin Gray (1999:17) defines strategy as
the “bridge that relates military power to political purpose.” US military services, the
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Combatant Commands and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) use the Joint
Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to accomplish unified strategic direction in the armed forces in
support of the elected civilian administration. They do so by understanding the civilian
leadership’s policy objectives, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS), and
determining the ends, ways, means, and associated risk required to accomplish these ends (Staff
2013:A3).
This ends, ways, means strategy development process utilizes forecasting as a major
portion of its development process. The military begins the process knowing its means, the assets
and capabilities available to conduct military operations, and ends- the military policy objectives
desired by the civilian administrators. Forecasting allows military strategists to visualize
potential combinations of military operations and capabilities to create courses of actions, or
ways, to connect the means and ends. As discussed in my introduction, forecasters must also
consider the actions and abilities of adversaries and potential enemies. These adversaries and
potential enemies seek to deny the friendly military force from accomplishing its selected ends.
The greater strategic, operational, and tactical environment can also limit or deny means by
effects other than adversarial actions. It can include both physical limitations (distances, rugged
topography, austere environments) and political considerations (alliances, international and state
law, ethnic differences, cultural norms) which can significantly affect the feasibility of potential
ways. Doing this successfully is difficult; oftentimes military leaders rely upon previous wartime
experience rather than logical examination of future perspectives when undertaking it (Fischhoff
1975).
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In some circumstances, it may be impossible to pursue any feasible ways due to existing
limitations in means. An example of this is the cancelled Operation Sea Lion, in which Germany
could not invade Great Britain in World War Two due to limitations in German naval combat
and landing craft (Schenk 1990:22-25, Millett and Murray 2000:66). Forecasting allows
strategists to identify a necessary change in means, for example, increasing the end strength of
the US Army by 50,000 soldiers during the 2007 Iraq surge, in order to make the ways course of
action a viable method to accomplish the desired ends (Knowlton Jr 2010, Gates 2014). The
ends, ways, means methodology, and its embedded forecasting requirements in each, not only
applies at the strategic level, but also at the operational and tactical levels of conflict.

Population of Interest
This research focuses on the forecasting abilities of a very specific population who operate at the
strategic, operational, and tactical level of war; Senior Field-grade US Army officers with at least
20 years of service. At the lower end of this spectrum these officers perform key functions
within the Army. They serve as the primary plans and policy action-officer for combatant
command headquarters, advisors and military liaisons for senior governmental policy makers,
and assistants to military four-star flag officers. This proximity grants some level of influence on
strategic policy. During military deployments, they lead large numbers of soldiers (500-3500) in
important and complex missions, which can include conventional combat, counterinsurgency,
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and foreign internal defense1. Despite operating at the tactical

1 See US Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ARDP) 3-90, (ARDP) 3-07, and US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-28 for the full list of US Army
missions tasks.
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level of war, their decisions may have worldwide strategic effect due to the impact of
instantaneous media and the personal nature of contemporary population-based conflict (Storr
2003:123). This officer population also provides the human capital from which future general
officers are selected. In 5-10 years, approximately 5% of these officers will be selected for
advancement to general officer, and directly in charge of strategic-level military policy decisions
(Eitelberg, Laurence et al. 1992). This population is rarely examined from an academic
perspective, due to the relatively insular nature of the military (Thornhill and Whitlark 2015).
Additionally, because these individuals have operated within the confines of the US Army
institution for two decades of their professional career, it is possible, despite personal
predilections, for them to internalize and subsequently utilize the habits and tendencies examined
in this research. Given their significant influence within the US Army, their success or failure at
forecasting has a strategic impact on US international policy and military effectiveness.

Theory- The Impact of US Army Institutional Tendencies and Habits
The US military exudes strong institutional tendencies and habits, often significantly
different than those of the general society in the US (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1964, Dunivin
1994, Feaver 1996, Feaver and Kohn 2001). My population of interest is professional US Army
officers, with at least 18 years of service, allowing significant time for norm inculcation.
Because organizational norms, tendencies and habits affect forecasting as part of the decisionmaking process (Rosen 1994, Allison and Zelikow 1999, Gartner 1999, Mintz, Redd et al. 2006,
Haerem, Kuvaas et al. 2011), it is likely that US military institutional tendencies and habits do
have some effect on US Army senior field-grade officer forecasting, especially due to the results
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of specialization, violations of rational decision-making, bias and sunk costs (Kruglanski and
Webster 1996, Tetlock 2005, Hastie and Dawes 2010). I now examine some institutional
tendencies and habits and hypothesize potential impacts.

Specialization
I begin with consideration of specialization, an organizational norm. Tetlock, in a 20-year
research study of political observers, found significant differences between “hedgehogs” and
“foxes.” Specialist “hedgehogs” are thinkers who often
Know one big thing, aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big
thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who do not ‘get
it,’ and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient
forecasters. (2005: 73)
Inversely, generalist “foxes” tend to
Know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand
schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather
as exercises in flexible ‘ad hocery’ that requires stitching together diverse
sources of information, and are rather indifferent about their own forecasting
prowess, and [are]…rather dubious that the cloudlike subject of politics can be
the object of a clocklike science. (2005:73, 75)

His research found generalists forecasted more accurately than specialists (Tetlock and Lebow
2001). Specialists made more extreme forecasts, discounted incorrect forecasting results, and
did not revisit assumptions upon which the predictions were made. Generalists were more
conservative in their predictions, revisited previous forecasts, and revised their estimates and
assumptions before forecasting again (Tetlock 2005).
The US Army contains both specialist and generalist-oriented officers. In 1996, the US
Army officer personnel management system (OPMS) XXI task force completed a yearlong study
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based on the assumption that “officers do too many things today for them to excel at any one of
them” (Urben 2017:1). Results of the study recommended that US Army officers, instead of
alternating between “specialized” jobs such as comptroller, strategist, and operations research,
and “generalist” combat arms jobs including infantry, armor, field artillery and special forces,
would instead be permanently divided. At approximately 10 years of service, officer self-selected
into specialized areas or remained in the operations field. Once this division was finalized, the
officers would remain in these separate career tracts for the duration of their military career, with
no opportunity for assignments in the tract opposite. Officers designated into a functional area
(FA) are specialists. FA-aligned officers are grouped into a technical specialty which usually
requires unique education, training and experience (Army 2014:11-12). Figure one below
identifies current US Army functional areas.
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FA 39 (PSYOP)
FA 90 (Logistician Program)
FA 24 (Telecommunications Systems Engineer)
FA 30 (Information Operations)
FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence)
FA 40 (Space Operations)
FA 46 (Public Affairs)
FA 53 (Information Systems Management)
FA 57 (Simulation Operations)
FA 43 (Human Resource Management)
FA 45 (Comptroller)
FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Associate Professor)
FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA))
FA 50 (Force Management)
FA 52 (Nuclear and Counterproliferation )
FA 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy)
FA 51 (Army Acquisition Corps)
FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer)
Figure 1: US Army Functional Area Designations (Army 2014)

With the exception of FA 39, 51, and 90, no other specialists are afforded opportunities to
command US Army formations. Upon selection, FA-identified officers subsequently receive
detailed training and education focused on their new specialty. From this point until the end of
their military career, they perform jobs limited to their specialization, though their
responsibilities increase as they rise in seniority. As an example, officers who select Strategic
Planner (FA 59) are expected to lead multidisciplinary planning groups and facilitate senior
leader decision-making by assessing, developing, and articulating policy, strategy, and plans at
the national and theater level. Upon entry to this functional area, they receive specialized
strategy training, education, and complete a master’s degree from a university in a strategyrelated field if they do not already possess one (Army 2014:285-289). They subsequently
assume staff planning positions throughout the US Department of Defense. As FA 59 officers
17

progress in seniority, they assume additional responsibility, moving from assistant to lead
planning responsibilities at different echelons in Army and joint military headquarters. This
specialization in training and education, as well as similarity in successive jobs, may lead them
to forecast using the well-established theories developed through their specialized education,
experience, and socialization. An additional group of US Army officers who qualify as
specialists are those that compose the “special branches.” These include members of the Judge
Advocate Generals (JAG or military lawyers), Chaplain Corps, Medical Corps (doctors), Dental
Corps, Veterinary Corps, and the Army Nurse Corps. These specialists generally complete their
advanced specialized schooling (medical, law, seminary, etc.) prior to commissioning. Upon
entry into the US Army, they are directly commissioned as US Army Captains, a rank that
normally requires four years for regular officers.
Those not functionally aligned or designated as a member of the special branches remain
in their original “branch” from when they first entered the Army and are termed “operations”
officers. These officers perform the traditional combat and combat support functions of the US
Army. Operations officers can perform a wide variety of staff and leadership jobs throughout
their military career, including senior command positions at the Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and
General Officer ranks. Examples of these are as wide-ranging as liaison officer to the US State
Department, aide to a commanding general, commander of an airborne infantry brigade at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, instructor at the United States Military Academy (USMA), and military
doctrine writer at the US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC). These jobs contain widely
varying responsibilities and requirements, including direct leadership of servicemen in various
operational environments. Operations officers, after approximately 12-15 years of service, are
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also given opportunities to attend graduate-level civilian schooling and serve in outside-of-Army
“broadening” assignments at joint service, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
(JIIM) organizational headquarters (Army 2014:5).
One could argue that this US Army specialist/operations branch is prescribed by military
assignment, and thus the individuals may not be psychologically predisposed to act as described
by Tetlock’s theory (Tetlock 2005); I disagree. Officers are not forced into these career choices;
they must self-select to become an FA-aligned or special branch officer. Research has shown that
psychological disposition effects career choice (DeLeon 1987, Lau and Shaffer 1999, Bozionelos
and Psychology 2004), thus military officers will choose a career paths in tune with their
personality traits. Admittedly, some may make a poor career choice and choose a branch
diametrically opposed to their psychological disposition. These officers likely would have left
military service well before reaching the senior ranks of officers evaluated in this research;
research supports this assumption (Boswell, Boudreau et al. 2005). Therefore, the senior officers
considered in this research are psychologically predisposed to their branch of choice and act in
accordance with Tetlock’s (2005, 2015) research.
Based upon the methodological deviations between Functional Area/Special branch and
operations branch officer training, education, jobs, and “broadening” opportunities, the
differences are apparent. In total, Functional Area/Special branch officers can be accurately
described as specialists; operations branch officers as generalists. Operations branch officers are
exposed to more diverse experiences, challenges, education, and opportunities to work outside of
their known area of expertise. This diversity makes operations branch officers more likely to
pursue generalist “fox” forecasting techniques. Inversely, Functional Area/Special branch
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officers, trained and experienced in a specific area of expertise, are more likely to pursue
specialist “hedgehog” forecasting techniques. With these considerations in mind and following
Tetlock’s finding, I hypothesize the following:
H1: Officers in Functional Areas/Special branches are less likely to accurately forecast future
events; those in the operations branches are more likely to accurately forecast future events
Limited Option Development
In the traditional military planning process, US Army commanders direct their staffs to
develop multiple options, or courses of action (COA), for potential employment. Each separate
COA is evaluated against forecasted enemy actions, scored and then assessed against each other
for final commander selection. Interestingly, this military decision-making process, officially
titled the operations process, closely resembles Hastie and Dawes’ (2010:3) rational decisionmaking process. They theorize that a rational decision is typically composed of several parts
including: a consideration of more than one possible course of action, a formulation of the
probabilities of outcomes of each course of action, a prediction of the anticipated outcomes, and
how they are assessed in consideration of current goals (Hastie and Dawes 2010:24). Failing to
use these techniques will likely result in a less than optimal forecasts and subsequent solutions
The US Army also has an abbreviated planning process known as the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process (RDSP) (Army 2012:4-6). RDSP differs from the
operations process by developing and synchronizing only a single course of action. Due to the
high operational tempo of US Army forces since 2001, many commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan chose to utilize the single-COA RDSP technique for military planning. Its
continued use for more than a decade has changed habits within the US Army. This single-COA
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option is generally accepted within the force. While Army doctrine justifies the single-COA
RDSP process as a situational timesaving measure when quick actions are needed, many officers
apply it all situations; even when enough time is available for a more thorough analysis.
Unfortunately, this skewed subset of possibilities is detrimental toward identifying the optimal
solution (Kruglanski and Webster 1996: 264, Hastie and Dawes 2010: 159).
Admittedly, RDSP saves time; it allows quick execution in a time-constrained
environment. However, it incurs a greater risk of mission failure. Hastie and Dawes (2010) and
Fischoff (1981) would consider RDSP a risky decision-making framework because it limits the
imagination of a full range of possibilities. Directing a single option makes a commander and
his/her staff susceptible to hindsight bias. As a result, the projected forecast of how events could
unfold are unrealized or incomplete. The commander and staff will focus only on the most
salient possibilities and consequences, likely at the cost of other details which, if forecasted
correctly, could lead to a more optimal decision. It also limits considerations of enemy actions
and reactions. Lacking this evaluated forecasting denies the development of most effective
tactics and countermeasures.
H2: Officers who consistently eschew multiple hypothesis development in decision-making are
less likely to accurately forecast future events
Neglect of Inconsistent Information
Ignoring information that is inconsistent with existing beliefs can also affect forecasting.
US Army commanders and staff can show a cultural-norm tendency to suppress or ignore any
information contrary to a developed plan. This situation, known in the US Army as “fighting
the plan,” can occur if a commander keeps his/her plan focused on initial anchors despite
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emerging evidence which indicates a necessity to change (Kruglanski and Webster 1996:265).
This especially occurs if officers invest significant energy into planning and preparation of a
complex plan prior to execution.
In cases of confirmation bias, or imperviousness to subsequent data phenomena, an
individual may feel a need for cognitive closure. Kruglanski and Webster define cognitive
closure as “an individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward
ambiguity” (1996:264). A consequence of this need for closure is a tendency for urgency and
permanence. Urgency is an inclination to make decisions quickly. Permanence is a desire to
perpetuate closure by discounting information which may discount the decision’s logical
foundation (1996:265). This discounting tendency is characterized by actions that seek
confirmatory evidence and discount contrary information. Moreover, the desire for cognitive
closure and permanence is heightened by external stimuli such as dullness of task, time pressure,
fatigue, value of a decision by others, or simply if a decision on the topic is required (Kruglanski
1975, Kruglanski and Webster 1996:264, Webster, Richter et al. 1996).
The US Army plans operations using the complex problem-solving processes of the
previously mentioned MDMP or the more abbreviated (but still complex) RDSP. These actions
require significant labor from members of the staff, often in a compressed timeframe. Members
of the staff are likely fatigued from nonstop operations, and under pressure to develop a product
quickly in order to allow subordinates enough time to prepare for their mission. These plans
include a complex support and logistics plan which ensures limited assets such as artillery and
aircraft support, communications, transportation, medical evacuation, reserve forces, and the like
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are synchronized into the overall plan. Preparing these complex missions are arduous
undertakings.
Additionally, a military leader may suppress inconsistent information out of a desire for
efficiency. Military leaders consider their military missions and objectives through the
ends/ways/means paradigm and prefer “formulaic solutions that reduce problems to manageable
terms, clarify responsibilities and calculations of capabilities I objectives, and maximize
certainty and efficiency” (Betts 1991:157). Contrary information “messes up” the synchronized
and well-resourced plan put in place at the beginning of the operation.
Because these conditions promote a tendency to “fight the plan,” it results in biased
perceptions of subsequent unfolding events. Service members are less likely to forecast enemy,
friendly, or environmental deviational actions which would throw the plan awry. Thus, rather
than attempting to refine the military operation through updated forecasts, they anchor on the
initial cues established at the beginning of the planning process, potentially leading to disastrous
results.
H3: US Army Officers who discount inconsistent information are less likely to accurately
forecast future events
Neglect of Deviational Views
Similar to confirmation bias, individuals desiring cognitive closure may also desire consensus
bias. Consensus bias is “a preference for consensual opinions that are unlikely to be challenged
and potentially undermined by significant others” (Kruglanski and Webster 1996:256). Those
who suffer from closure:
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Prefer to associate with similar-minded others, feel positively disposed toward
group members who facilitate consensus, and feel negatively disposed toward
dissenters or opinion deviates who jeopardize consensus. (1996:265)
Consensus bias from an institutional tendencies and habits perspective is also possible in the US
Army, enabled by its hierarchical command structure. A commander, responsible for all
personnel within a unit, and the actions of it, almost always demands consensus on a course of
action once it is decided upon. Army regulations specify that a “chain of command facilitates
the transmittal of orders from the highest to the lowest levels in a minimum of time and with the
least chance of misinterpretation” (Army 2008:2-1). Although this regulation also states
“Soldiers are responsible to ensure that the commander is made aware of problems that
affect…mission effectiveness,” (2008:2-2) commanders, exercising individual perspectives, and
members of the staff, under the pressure of Army rigid hierarchical cultural habits, could feel
negatively disposed toward dissenters or opinion deviators who jeopardize consensus
(Kruglanski and Webster 1996:265). Although a commander could appoint an individual or
team to critically appraise the plans and decisions of a headquarters in an effort to revise and
improve them, this does not happen on a consistent basis, nor does military doctrine specify this
as a mandatory part of the military planning process. Admittedly, a commander could simply
not want others to disagree with him/her, rather than be suffering from consensus bias, however,
since the outcome of both scenarios are identical (another is unwilling to voice a discordant
opinion), I treat both scenarios identically.
This negatively affects forecasting ability because focusing only on the most salient
possibilities and consequences while ignoring legitimate deviational information is indicative of
incomplete thinking (Hastie and Dawes 2010:33). Tetlock (2005:85) has clearly shown that
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superior forecasters are more likely to consider and integrate conflicting ideas; poorer forecasters
discount them.
H4: US Army officers who discourage dissenting opinions are less likely to accurately forecast
future events
Doctrinal Reliance
Military doctrine can be applied at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. An
example of US military operational/strategic doctrine includes US Air-Land Battle doctrine of
the 1980s and 1990s, which combined land force defense with air and indirect fire deep attacks
to attrit the rear echelon of attacking enemy forces (Richardson 1997). An example of US
military tactical doctrine is Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) No. 3-06.11,
Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, which provides techniques to establish a foothold
and subsequently exploit attacks into cities using combined-arms tactics. (Army 2011). The US
Department of Defense defines military doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” (Staff
2001:71). Unfortunately, some US Army officers fail to apply the next sentence, which states,
“It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (Staff 2001:71). Those who fail to
apply judgment in application exercise individual perspectives and instead create a bias toward
consistency, thus resulting in a misapplication in theory (Welch 2005:12). They subsequently
develop courses of action generally unchanged from their previous situation and wholly unfit for
the situation in which it is meant to be applied (Kruglanski and Webster 1996:265). A historical
example of improper doctrinal reliance is General William Westmoreland’s use of conventional
methods to fight an insurgency during the American war in Vietnam (Krepinevich Jr 2009).
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Hastie (2010:17-19) describes the three heuristics of irrational decision-making; when
one chooses by habit (what we have chosen before), when one chooses by conformity (making
the same decision as what most other people would do), or when one chooses by cultural
mandates. By using these tendencies, decision-makers make poor choices because they neglect
to consider all possible consequences of a choice. Relying on rote military doctrinal solutions
mirrors some of these tendencies. Admittedly, military doctrine is a critical component of a
state’s national security policy which defines how it can best secure itself (Posen 1993:13-33),
however it is also a heuristic- an “efficient, but [sometimes] inaccurate problem-solving
procedure learned through experience...and deliberate instruction” (Hastie and Dawes 2010:88).
Hastie has shown overreliance on heuristic problem-solving procedures results in
inaccuracy in predictions and forecasting (2010:89-90). Similarly, Tetlock (2005:214) has
found that theory-driven thinking, similar in application to doctrinal solutions, “desensitizes us to
nuance, complexity, [and] contingency” necessary for superior forecasting. In simple terms, an
overreliance on doctrinal heuristic results in poor overall analysis of the problem. The forecaster
assumes that a doctrinal action would accomplish an outcome at a much higher probability of
success than should be warranted given the unique friendly, enemy, and environmental
conditions present in the situation. Only by fully examining all aspects of the scenario can this
occur. As a result, the intended strength of military doctrine, bringing order and coherence to the
battlefield, could potentially be a detriment to effective forecasting.
Fortunately, most US Army Officers, after multiple deployments to complex
environments in Afghanistan and Iraq, acknowledge some military doctrinal solutions and
processes are “ill-suited for the analysis of problems exhibiting high volatility, uncertainty,
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complexity, and ambiguity” (Williams 2010:41). Despite this, others undoubtedly rely on rote
doctrine, blandly applied, as the primary solution for all problem sets.

H5: US Army officers consistently reliant on rote doctrinal solutions are less likely to accurately
forecast future events

Sunk Costs
Lastly, significant consideration of previous efforts and investments in time and personnel can
promote bad predictions. Known in academia as sunk costs, they are defined as a cost which has
already been incurred and cannot be recovered (Sherman 2008). Considering sunk costs in
decisions and predictions violate Hastie and Dawes’ first law criterion of rational decisionmaking, which is that decisions should only be based on future consequences (2010:36).
Unlike confirmation bias, which discounts deviational information that could threaten the
logical support of a completed forecast and decision, sunk costs are considered at the beginning
of the forecasting development process, irreparably skewing the results. As described in
cognitive-dissonance theory, military leaders may exaggerate the forecasted benefits of “staying
the course” in an effort to make sense of or justify costly losses (Festinger 1957). This could be
especially prevalent among military leaders who feel guilt for subordinate casualties. Although
military leaders may avoid initial commitment to conflict because they “don’t want to risk lives
and limbs if there isn’t a high probability of a payoff” (Jaffe 2015), many officers feel the only
acceptable outcome for previous significant investments such as these is continued military
action, eventually leading to victory. A prime example of this is the 2001-2019 war in
Afghanistan; despite the limited return from pursuing continued conflict in this war, many
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civilians and military leaders see value in continuing operations there (Ricks 2015). As a result,
individual and cultural-norm considerations of sunk-costs are often involved in US Army
forecasting and decision-making as justifications for action.
H6: US Army Officers who significantly consider sunk costs are less likely to accurately forecast
future events

Research Design
This paper seeks to answer what is the impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on
US Army senior officer forecasting accuracy via a quantitative analysis of all six hypotheses
using survey-based data. My unit of analysis for this research are individual US Army
Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels at the US Army War College. This demographic serves as the
primary plans and policy action-officer for combatant command headquarters, advisors and
military liaisons for senior governmental policy makers, and assistants to military four-star flag
officers. This proximity grants some level of influence on strategic policy. During military
deployments, they lead large numbers of soldiers (500-3500). This officer population also
provides the human capital from which future general officers are selected. My methodology
attempts to closely match Tetlock’s sampling, instrument, and data collection processes (Tetlock
2005:241-246).

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (DV) is accuracy in forecasting (forecast accuracy), operationalized as a
0 to 100-percentage average accuracy in predicting, via survey response, 20 events that could
occur during the three to twelve months after the survey was administered. This time frame,
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shorter than Tetlock’s (2005) 2-5 year forecast horizon, allowed me to collect, code, and analyze
the survey data within the research timeline mandated by my supporting agency. Respondents
forecasted by selecting from a 0 to 100-percentage chance of the event occurring. This response
methodology mirrored Tetlock’s (2005) methods, and assessed both their prediction accuracy as
well as how strongly they believed this prediction (Figure 2). Forecast questions were potential
national and international political, security, economic, and business events (see appendix A).
Although some questions addressed operational and strategic military events; well within the
purview of senior US military officers; many were not, though they speak to dynamics in the
world that will influence strategic conditions in coming years. Forecasts questions outside of the
subjects’ area of expertise assesses if the respondents, like superior forecasters in Tetlock’s
(2015) research, conduct additional research to make an informed guess on the assessment. The
respondents had access to external information sources, such as online news and information
websites during the online survey, and thus could make informed forecasts if they chose to do so.

Figure 2: Forecast Response Scaling (Tetlock 2005:245)

Upon closure of the three to twelve-month period, I assessed which events occurred. If the
forecasted event did occur, the respondent score (1-100) remained untouched. If the event did
not occur, responses were subtracted from 100. All results were averaged into a consolidated
forecast accuracy score per respondent (forecast accuracy). Acknowledging that some events
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are much easier to predict than others, I also generated a trimmed value (forecast accuracy
trimmed) that excluded questions in which the combined sample overwhelmingly predicted the
event occurring or not occurring (80% of the entire survey sample forecasted the event
correctly). For the trimmed value variable, the average number of excluded questions for all
three surveys was six. 1

Explanatory variables
This research includes six explanatory variables determined from survey response. To test
hypothesis #1 (officers in specialized branches are less likely to accurately forecast future events
in their field of expertise; those in the operational branches are more likely to accurately forecast
future events), I consider the variable of specialization, defined as US Army officers who are one
of the 17 functionally-aligned branches specified in figure one plus specialized branches of
Judge Advocate Generals (JAG), Chaplain Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary
Corps, and the Army Nurse Corps. Since specialists are less likely to forecast accurately, I used
dichotomous methods to code specialists as 0, operations officers as 1. I expect generalists to
achieve higher accuracy on forecasting ability. The majority of respondents in all three survey
samples were operations officers, with mean values of .83, .78, .78 respectively.
The remaining explanatory variables are each determined by using a composite sum of
responses to three or four survey questions for each variable of interest. To test hypothesis #2
(officers who consistently eschew multiple hypothesis development in decision-making are less

A trimmed value removes a small designated percentage of the largest and smallest
values, thus excluding those forecasts in which a majority forecasted correctly or
incorrectly, allowing the researcher to focus on the area of greatest variability.
1
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likely to accurately forecast future events), I examine the variable COA. It is an ordinal variable
scaled 0 (always direct a single COA) through 4 (always direct multiple COA). I expect a higher
score to correlate with higher forecast accuracy. The majority of respondents in all three survey
samples tended toward multiple COA, with mean values of 3.4, 3.4, 3.5 respectively.
To test my third hypothesis (officers who discount inconsistent information are less likely
to accurately forecast future events), I measure the variable Inconsistent. It is an interval
variable scaled 0 (always discount inconsistent information) through 3 (always consider
inconsistent information). I expect a higher score to correlate with higher forecast accuracy. The
majority of respondents in all three survey samples generally considered inconsistent
information, with mean values of 2.28, 2.18, 2.27 respectively.
I measure my fourth hypothesis (Officers who discourage dissenting opinions are less
likely to accurately forecast future events), by considering the variable Dissent, is an ordinal
variable scaled 0 (always discourage/ignore dissenting opinions), 1 (ignore dissenting opinions),
2 (generally ignore dissenting opinions), 3 (generally solicit dissenting opinions), and 4 (always
solicit dissenting opinions). I expect a higher score to correlate with higher forecast accuracy.
The majority of respondents in all three survey samples generally considered valued dissent, with
mean values of 9.1, 9.1, 9.3 (of a possible 12) respectively.
I measure my fifth hypothesis (US Army officers consistently reliant on rote doctrinal
solutions are less likely to accurately forecast future events) using the variable Doctrine. It is an
ordinal variable scaled 1 (completely reliant on doctrine for solutions), 2 (generally relay on
doctrine for solutions), 3 (rarely rely on doctrine for solutions), 4 (never rely on doctrine for
solutions). I expect a higher score to correlate with higher forecast accuracy. The majority of
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respondents in all three survey samples generally did not rely on doctrine, with mean values of
8.8, 8.3, 7.9 (of a possible 12) respectively.
I test my last hypothesis (US Army Officers who significantly consider sunk costs are
less likely to accurately forecast future events) using the variable Sunk Cost. It is an ordinal
variable scaled 1 (always consider sunk costs), 2 (sometime consider sunk costs), 3 (rarely
consider sunk costs), 4 (never consider sunk costs). I expect a higher score to correlate with
higher forecast accuracy. The majority of respondents in all three survey samples generally
somewhat considered sunk costs, with mean values of 7.8, 7.2, 7.5 (of a possible 12)
respectively.
My primary control is Education. Research has shown higher levels of education can
mitigate the pitfalls of logical fallacies (L Ross 1980:191). I thus expect officers with higher
levels of education to be less subject to the normative fallacies that negatively affect forecasting.
I expect an increase in education to be correlated with increased forecast accuracy. This control
variable will be an ordinal variable scaled 1 (bachelor’s degree only), 2 (at least one master’s
degree), and 3 (PhD or MD).
My second control is combat experience (combat tours). Although high-tempo
peacetime training activities may promote the institutional tendencies and habits discussed in my
theory, combat operations directly feed them. Military officers deployed to combat are subject to
accelerated timelines, stress, casualties, high uncertainty, and exhaustion; all of which negatively
affect forecasting and decision-making (Kruglanski 1975, Kruglanski and Webster 1996:264,
Webster, Richter et al. 1996). I therefore posit that an increase in combat tours is inversely
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related to forecast accuracy.

This control is an interval variable that equal the number of

combat deployments (7 months or more) that the officer participated in.
My third control is Active Duty, which indicates whether the surveyed officer is an active
component officer or reserve component (US Army National Guard or US Army Reserve).
Since reserve component officers most often serve in a “part-time” capacity, they are less likely
to have developed the shared institutional tendencies and habits that full-time serving active duty
officers are likely to show. This control variable will be a dichotomous variable, with 1
indicating if the surveyed officer is active component, 0 indicating reserve component (US Army
National Guard or US Army Reserve). I expect active duty officers to more fully embrace the
negative military institutional tendencies and habits when compared to non-active duty
counterparts; therefore, active duty officers are more likely to forecast poorly. Source of data is
a response to the survey question “what is your duty status?”
I also include two demographic measurement indicators including: did the officer
command a military formation at the Lieutenant Colonel level, and how confident are they at
forecasting accurately.

Survey Sample
To collect data for this research, I conducted three online surveys of US Army Lieutenant
Colonels and Colonels attending the US Army War College (USAWC) or participating in the US
Army War College Fellows program. I generated the surveys formats using Qualtrics survey
software. Samples were students from the 2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2018-2019 academic
year. One survey (survey 1- 2016) was conducted in the latter part of the 2015-2016 academic
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year (Jan-Feb). Two surveys (survey 2-Fall 2016, survey 3- Fall 2018) were collected early in
each respective Army War College/Fellowship academic year (September-October). US Army
War College faculty distributed anonymous survey links via email for voluntary response;
respondents could only respond once. Responders had approximately 30 days in which to
respond. The population available for each survey included approximately 220-225 Army
officers in the resident AWC class, and approximately 90 War College Fellows.2 Each survey
sample resulted in a response measuring at least the 10% threshold expected for legitimate
research with 42, 32, and 67 respondents (of approximately 310-315) respectively.

Results
Using Stata, all models were estimated using OLS linear regression since both the explanatory
and dependent variable were interval values. The results of my analysis are depicted below in
tables one through five. Table one through three examine each representative survey sample,
Table four examines combined samples, while Table five examines combined samples of survey
two and three.
Since I was determined to measure the effect of institutional tendencies and habits on US
Army officers, I combined surveys two and three because they are most similar; both surveys
were collected early in the AWC academic year and thus “uncorrupted” by possible educational
fallacy mitigation (L Ross 1980:191). Additionally these survey respondents were less likely to
be influenced by the frequent survey response (FSR) bias (Whitsett 2013) or “survey fatigue”
resultant of multiple surveys taken in the academic year.

2

Data provided by the US Army War College.
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All table regressions contain four combinations: all explanatory and demographic
variables against an unmodified dependent variable, explanatory variables minus demographic
variables against an unmodified dependent variable, all explanatory and demographic variables
against a trimmed dependent variable, and explanatory variables minus demographic variables
against a trimmed dependent variable.
For my first hypothesis, Officers in Functional Areas/Special branches are less likely to
accurately forecast future events; those in the operations branches are more likely to accurately
forecast future events, I find some statistically significant relationships between operations
officers and forecasting accuracy. Tables 1, and 3-5 relationship results are not significant,
however the majority of the resulting coefficients trend positively. Table two contains three of
four regressions that show some statistically significant relationships between the relevant
independent variable and forecasting accuracy and coefficients supporting my hypothesis. Table
2 can possibly be explained by an examination of summary statistics; a smaller number in the
survey two mean value indicates a higher number of “specialists” in the sample (“Specialists” are
coded as 0 while “generalists” are coded as 1). This increased variance allowed a more accurate
measure of the interaction. Given the consistent coefficient trend and significance in several
regressions, I find some support to my hypothesis.
Examining the results of my second hypothesis, Officers who consistently eschew
multiple hypothesis development in decision-making are less likely to accurately forecast future
events, I find no statistically significant relationships between the relevant independent variable
and forecasting accuracy in support of my theory. The resultant coefficients are mixed in trend.
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Some are positive, however the majority of them are negative, running opposite to my
hypothesis.
For my third hypothesis, US Army Officers who discount inconsistent information are
less likely to accurately forecast future events, I similarly find non-conclusive results, though the
resultant coefficients trend more positive than negative.
My fourth hypothesis, H4: US Army officers who discourage dissenting opinions are less
likely to accurately forecast future events, also generally has non-conclusive results. One result
that showed statistically significant relationships between the relevant independent variable and
forecasting accuracy, the trimmed regression that did not include demographic variables, has a
coefficient trending opposite to my hypothesis, but in no way allows me to make an overall
judgement on the variable at play.
My fifth hypothesis, US Army officers consistently reliant on rote doctrinal solutions are
less likely to accurately forecast future events, has some supporting results. All 20 coefficients
trend in my expected direction and all table 4 (combined surveys) and half of table 5 (trimmed
results of survey 2-3) showed statistically significant relationships between the relevant
independent variable and forecasting accuracy.
In my last hypothesis, US Army Officers who significantly consider sunk costs are less
likely to accurately forecast future events, I find the results overwhelmingly support results
inverse to my hypothesis; there is statistically significant relationships between the relevant
independent variable and forecasting accuracy, but in the opposite direction of what I
hypothesized. Almost all coefficients trended opposite of my theory; all regression coefficients
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in table two and three quarters of coefficients in table five showed statistically significant
relationships between the relevant independent variable and forecasting accuracy.
In control variables, Education, trended toward relevance. In addition to the great
prevalence of coefficients trending positively, several of them showed statistically significant
relationships between this control variable and forecasting accuracy, indicating that more highly
educated US Army officers are more likely to forecast accurately. Officers with more Combat
Tours tended to forecast less effectively. 5 of 6 tables show statistically significant relationships
between the relevant independent variable and forecasting accuracy.

There was no apparent

difference between an Active versus reserve component officers’ ability to forecast. No results
showed statistically significant relationships between the being active duty and forecasting
accuracy and the trends were equally mixed. Lastly, the demographic variables Command and
Confidence were showed no significant relationships, nor were they overwhelmingly trending in
one direction or another.
Further examining raw data to determine if certain “mental models” existed and were
correlated to particular effectiveness or ineffectiveness in forecasting, I could not find consistent
patterns of a certain psychological profile. No respondent scored consistently low in all
variables including multiple COA, tolerance of ambiguity, tolerance of dissent, and resistance to
rote doctrine. In a few cases some respondents scored slightly higher in all variables, and their
corresponding forecasting score was slightly above average, but not dramatically so. Instead,
respondents tended to score low in some variables and alternatively high in others.
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Table 1: Effect of Mil. Institutional Tendencies and Habits on Forecasting (S1- JAN-FEB 2016)

Variables
Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(trimmed)
-1.802
-.471
-3.071
(6.894)
(8.371)
(3.847)
-1.813
-1.044
-2.117
(2.335)
(2.137)
(1.970)
-1.205
.902
-1.576
(2.222)
(2.452)
(2.477)
-.488
-.205
-.465
(1.756)
(1.648)
(1.130)
3.362
2.750
-.886
(2.284)
(2.063)
(1.202)
-.004
.334
1.173
(1.782)
(1.689)
(.842)
.318
-.564
-.514
(4.706)
(5.648)
(2.553)
.2.068
-1.720
.146
(3.172)
(2.849)
(2.036)
-7.584
-6.244
1.443
(6.229)
(5.176)
(3.573)
5.858
4.554
(4.714)
(4.872)
6.213
6.055
(4.312)
(4.537)

Regression 4
(trimmed)
-2.131
(4.381)
-1.414
(1.772)
.243
(1.890)
-.201
(1.099)
-1.450
(1.281)
1.471
(.971)
-1.437
(2.798)
.619
(2.880)
2.470
(3.148)

N
42
42
42
162
R2
.224
.133
.227
.112
____________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Table 2: Effect of Mil. Institutional Tendencies and Habits on Forecasting (S2 SEP-OCT 2016)

Variables
Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(trimmed)
7.308
8.018*
6.618
(4.827)
(3.255)
(3.657)
.031
.327
-.274
(1.470)
(1.372)
(1.584)
-.190
.016
1.032
(1.893)
(1.806)
(1.724)
-1.643
-1.535
-1.920
(1.210)
(.959)
(1.097)
.910
.716
.545
(.841)
(.838)
(.789)
-2.861*
-2.790**
-2.473**
(.829)
(.734)
(.669)
5.648
6.279*
7.127*
(3.195)
(2.850)
(2.311)
-4.282*
-3.752*
-4.314*
(1.779)
(1.526)
(1.575)
3.795
3.951
3.800
(4.068)
(3.807)
(2.671)
2.547
3.119
(5.863)
(5.067)
-1.479
-1.170
(2.974)
(2.560)

Regression 4
(trimmed)
7.619*
(2.502)
-.046
(1.474)
1.188
(1.700)
-1.696*
(.803)
.341
(.770)
-2.404**
(.596)
7.688**
(2.081)
-3.834*
(1.390)
3.824
(2.410)

N
32
32
32
32
R2
.609
.598
.625
.614
____________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Table 3: Effect of Mil. Institutional Tendencies and Habits on Forecasting (S3 SEP-OCT 2018)

Variables
Specialization
COA
Deviation
Inconsistent
Doctrine
Sunk cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(trimmed)
-.442
1.039
.129
(3.080)
(2.957)
(3.330)
-1.573
-1.689
-1.792
(1.192)
(1.129)
(1.439)
2.444
1.813
.638
(1.613)
(1.627)
(1.554)
-.075
.369
-.215
(1.062)
(1.099)
(1.227)
1.151
1.114
1.042
(.709)
(.655)
(.724)
-.291
-.240
-1.154
(.839)
(.831)
(.685)
.753
1.709
.876
(2.629)
(2.535)
(2.770)
-1.932
-1.553
--1.142
(1.126)
(1.043)
(1.146)
-.937
-.979
.830
(2.442)
(2.475)
(2.505)
2.066
.294
(2.765)
(2.803)
-2.787
-2.511
(1.918)
(1.993)

Regression 4
(trimmed)
.626
(2.879)
-1.926
(1.358)
.055
(1.625)
-.145
(1.279)
.944
(.679)
-1.072
(.691)
1.712
(2.713)
-.940
(1.106)
.838
(2.511)

N
66
66
66
66
R2
.183
.156
.128
.110
____________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Table 4: Effect of Mil. Institutional Tendencies and Habits on Forecasting (Combined S1-3)

Variables
Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(trimmed)
1.949
.715
-.386
(2.932)
(2.619)
(2.461)
-.976
-.976
-1.506
(.988)
(.994)
(1.075)
1.567
1.635
.123
(1.223)
(1.212)
(1.279)
.312
.151
-.872
(.709)
(.709)
(.785)
1.033*
1.003*
1.196*
(.527)
(.514)
(.608)
-.539
-.554
-.481
(.724)
(.722)
(.587)
.499
.166
1.723
(2.191)
(2.145)
(1.751)
-.962
-1.175
-1.586
(.799)
(.770)
(.895)
-3.605
-3.794
2.511
(2.018)
(2.033)
(1.965)
-3.273
5.151*
(2.479)
(2.268)
.640
-1.908
(1.446)
(1.780)

Regression 4
(trimmed)
1.572
(2.210)
-1.541
(1.072)
-.089
(1.262)
-.610
(.774)
1.206*
(.615)
-.417
(.592)
2.485
(1.723)
-1.184
(1.106)
2.908
(2.003)

N
140
140
140
140
R2
.095
.084
.128
.092
____________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Table 5: Effect of Mil. Institutional Tendencies and Habits on Forecasting (Combined S2-3)

Variables
Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(trimmed)
3.137
2.196
2.283
(3.046)
(2.487)
(2.305)
-.824
-.899
-1.198
(1.186)
(1.190)
(1.007)
2.339
2.187
.735
(1.276)
(1.256)
(1.154)
-.106
-.191
-.446
(.801)
(.809)
(.758)
1.021
.869
1.188*
(.586)
(.550)
(.526)
-1.181*
-1.085
-1.684**
(.606)
(.611)
(.501)
1.629
1.921
2.055
(2.012)
(1.847)
(2.097)
-.810
-.789
-2.027*
(.863)
(.804)
(.825)
-3.027
-2.916
1.583
(2.092)
(2.127)
(1.978)
-1.851
.674
(2.802)
(2.348)
-1.384
-2.377
(1.515)
(1.383)

Regression 4
(trimmed)
2.561
(2.061)
-1.217
(.970)
.424
(1.191)
.333
(.751)
1.052*
(.503)
-1.584*
(.500)
2.735
(2.060)
1.786*
(.795)
1.924
(1.976)

N
98
98
98
98
R2
.123
.112
.227
.205
____________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk Cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence
Forecasting Ability
Forecasting Ability (T)

Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk Cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence
Forecasting Ability
Forecasting Ability (T)

Specialization
COA
Inconsistent
Dissent
Doctrine
Sunk Cost
Education
Combat Tour
Active Duty
Command
Confidence
Forecasting Ability
Forecasting Ability (T)

Survey 1 (JAN-FEB 2016)
Variable Type
Observations
Mean
Dummy
42
0.833
Ordinal
42
3.405
Ordinal
42
2.286
Ordinal
42
9.119
Ordinal
42
8.81
Ordinal
42
7.786
Ordinal
42
2.071
Interval
42
3.381
Dummy
42
0.81
Dummy
42
0.643
Ordinal
42
2.214
Interval
42
57.61
Interval
42
62.401
Survey 2 (SEP-OCT 2016)
Variable Type
Observations
Mean
Dummy
32
0.781
Ordinal
32
3.437
Ordinal
32
2.188
Ordinal
32
9.125
Ordinal
32
8.25
Ordinal
32
7.281
Ordinal
32
2.093
Interval
32
2.219
Dummy
32
0.906
Dummy
32
0.875
Ordinal
32
2.406
Interval
32
59.014
Interval
32
54.091
Survey 3 (SEP-OCT 2018)
Variable Type
Observations
Mean
Dummy
67
0.788
Ordinal
67
3.492
Ordinal
67
2.269
Ordinal
67
9.343
Ordinal
67
7.851
Ordinal
67
7.507
Ordinal
67
1.925
Interval
67
3.045
Dummy
67
0.537
Dummy
67
0.731
Ordinal
67
2.537
Interval
67
64.307
Interval
67
49.581

Figure 3: Summary Statistics
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Std. Dev.
0.377
0.798
0.835
1.173
1.596
1.842
0.463
1.081
0.397
0.485
0.47
11.688
9.341

Min.
0
1
1
6
5
3
1
1
0
0
1
16.92
25.857

Max.
1
4
3
11
12
12
3
5
1
1
3
73.538
74.429

Std. Dev.
0.42
0.84
0.693
1.385
1.32
1.8
0.39
1.008
0.296
0.336
0.665
8.519
8.181

Min.
0
1
1
6
6
4
1
1
0
0
1
33.158
33.333

Max.
1
4
3
11
12
11
3
4
1
1
3
71.053
67.333

Std. Dev.
0.412
0.859
0.845
1.262
1.752
1.608
0.502
1.272
0.502
0.447
0.586
9.281
9.259

Min.
0
1
0
7
4
3
1
1
0
0
1
41.778
22.333

Max.
1
5
3
12
12
11
3
5
1
1
4
83.5
68.833

Conclusion and Future Research
The somewhat inconclusive results for much of this research clearly demonstrates the challenges
of small n research. Although each of the surveys met the 10% threshold for legitimate sampling
standards, the overall small population of the AWC and Fellowship programs, tied with AWC
administrative requirements to limit surveys to voluntary response, resulted in a small sample per
class. Voluntary response also results in bias that makes it somewhat less representative of the
implied population (Wilson, Journell et al. 2011:172). Additionally, the forecasting window was
abbreviated, with respondents asked to forecast events only for a single time period. This runs
counter to Tetlock’s research methodologies that examine a number of respondents over a
several year period (Tetlock 2005, Tetlock and Gardner 2015). To achieve truly conclusive
results, this research must survey a representative sample of the almost 13,000 Lieutenant
Colonels and Colonels in the US Army over a multiple year period. This is highly challenging
given the US military’s tendency toward insularity and protection of its servicemembers’ time.
Despite this, some conclusions can be drawn from the research results. The demonstrated
effect of specialization on forecasting ability supports Tetlock’s (2005, 2015) findings that
individuals with more diverse experiences and education are more effective at forecasting. It
also provides justification for the US Army to expand opportunities for its officers to pursue
broadening opportunities, such as civilian graduate school. These broadening opportunities are
assignments
outside [a military officers] comfort zone, where they cannot solely
leverage their own past experiences in the Army in order to excel and
where they are exposed to different organizational cultures and dynamics.
(Babcock-Lumish 2016:34)
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Additionally, it provides some justification for reexamining the current US Army officer
personnel management system (OPMS XXI). In OPMS XXI, officers are separated into
functional areas (i.e. specialized branches) and operational branches at approximately eight years
of service. From that point forward, they cannot alternate between operational and specialized
jobs. Justification for this change, instituted in 1996, was because the previous system required
“officers to do too many things…for them to excel at any one of them” (Urben 2017:1). In the
opinion of some researchers, OPMS XXI is a failed stove-piped system3. The lack of alternating
learning has resulted in senior general officer decision-makers who are unprepared to operate
effectively at the strategic level. This is in stark contrast to pre-OPMS XXI generals who were
savvier at the strategic level due to various assignments in both specialized and generalized jobs
(Colarusso and Lyle 2014, Urben 2017). This research provides some quantitative justification
for arguments to remove the barrier of impermeability between functional area and general
branch assignments.
This research demonstrates that officers less reliant on doctrinal solutions are more
effective at forecasting. While good for this research, I suspect it is also the result of a dynamic
change within the US Army. For 18+ years the officer population experienced combat, mostly in
a fluid counterinsurgent environment. Officers developed and implemented tactics, techniques,
and procedures initially on their own and later under the broad directives of the 2006-

See Colarusso, M. J. and D. S. Lyle (2014). Senior officer talent management: Fostering
institutional adaptability, ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA STRATEGIC
STUDIES INSTITUTE.
, Urben, H. A. (2017). Reconnecting Athens and Sparta: A Review of OPMS XXI at 20
Years. Institute of Land Warfare. Arlington, VA, Association of the US Army.
3
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counterinsurgency doctrine. This COIN doctrine was much less prescriptive than the previouslydeveloped doctrine, designed for synchronized high-intensity conflict. As a result, the US Army
officer corps as a whole is less likely to be overly reliant on rote doctrinal solutions. An
examination of the summary statistics shows means values in all three datasets leaning heavily
against reliance on doctrine.
The results indicating that (contrary to my hypothesis) US Army Officers who
significantly consider sunk costs are more likely to accurately forecast future events is an
interesting phenomenon. It is likely the result of the unique demographics of the survey sample.
Almost 75% of the survey respondents commanded a unit as a Lieutenant Colonel, and all of
them deployed on at least one combat tour. It can be deduced that a significant portion of them
lost soldiers under their command while in combat. This, as well as the pride these leaders take
in accomplishing missions in an arduous combat environment, make the survey sample
participants more prone to consider sunk cost tendencies. Hence almost all of the survey
officers, including those who are the most effective forecasters, have a higher than usual
proclivity to considering sunk costs. I expect that senior leaders in the military as a whole tend
to fall into this same phenomenon. The only potential solution for curing this tendency is
educating military leaders and strategists on Hastie and Dawes’ first law criterion of rational
decision-making, which is that decisions should only be based on future consequences (2010:36).
I expect, however, for this to be a hard sell for combat leaders psychologically scarred by
previous subordinate casualties.
The results associated with the controls adds to existing research and inform military
policy. A greater amount of education is positively associated with forecasting ability. This
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supports previous research (L Ross 1980, Tetlock and Gardner 2015). It also provides
justification to expand opportunities for US Army officers to attend civilian graduate school
(Spain, Mohundro et al. 2015, Urben 2017). Higher numbers of combat tours are negatively
associated with forecasting ability. Over the last two decades, the US has committed to multiple
sustained conflicts with a modestly-sized military force, leading to a high operational tempo for
its servicemembers. As a result, high-deploying officers are stuck in a vicious cycle; time in
combat precludes them from participating in broadening opportunities which provide the
knowledge that would make them more successful in combat. The only solution is to limit
military commitments to a level that allows consistent breaks for broadening of the force, or
increasing military end-strength to allow the depth for it.
Lastly, examination of the raw data makes it clear that no clear psychological profile
exists that shows some US Army officers have completely absorbed or resisted all negative
institutional habits and tendencies. Instead it is quite apparent that all absorb some, yet resist
others. This is not surprising, given two considerations. First, although the US Army is a highly
institutionalized organization, it remains a derivative of the highly individualistic nation in which
it resides. Personal opinions and initiative are tolerated to a much higher degree than would be
in a military of a more totalitarian or class-based state, such as the Cold War Soviet Union or 19th
century British Army. Secondly, US Army officers live a somewhat mobile life. They generally
change jobs and geographic assignments every two to three years. Each assignment brings
contact with different superiors, peers and subordinates who likely influence personal attitudes,
outlooks and decision-making methods.
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In conclusion, this research provides initial support to the theory that military institutional
tendencies and habits somewhat affect US Army senior officer forecasting accuracy. Although
more research is needed to conclusively support this theory, it provides logical justification for
the US Army to take action to enable effective forecasting and logical decision-making,
especially given the complexity of contemporary political-strategic affairs. Foremost in these
efforts should be increasing opportunities for broadening experiences, especially attendance at
civilian graduate schooling. These experiences will be an investment in the future.
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CHAPTER THREE:
SENIOR GENERAL CASE STUDY
Introduction
Most military decisions are based upon forecasts. Forecasts “help decision makers
anticipate future events, avoid strategic surprises, and make informed decisions” (Mandel and
Barnes 2014:1). Military and security intelligence is closely tied to forecasting, and “although
not all intelligence is predictive, forecasts are an important part of intelligence, serving to reduce
uncertainty about future events for decision makers” (Kaplan, Fischhoff et al. 2011:3-27).
Military planners forecast potential adversaries and adversarial capabilities to allow friendly
forces to develop equipment, tactics, and overall capabilities, which can counter the advantages
of a challenger. Thus, successful forecasting can allow a military force to operate from a
position of relative advantage to its competitor.
Historically, the United States’ military has had mixed success in correctly forecasting its
adversary’s capabilities, organizing itself for warfare, and fighting in the most appropriate way.
This was readily apparent in the opening stages of the Korean War. In late June, 1950, the US
military failed to accurately forecast the capabilities of the invading Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces, which rapidly drove south from the 38th parallel after
shattering US-backed Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. In response, in early July 1950, the US
hastily deployed Task Force 1-21 Infantry, (Task Force Smith), a poorly trained and equipped
US infantry battalion assigned to constabulary duty in Japan, to stem the tide of the DPRK
attack. The failure in US forecasting was apparent; “badly outnumbered and without armor,
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effective antitank weapons, or air support, the [TF Smith] was overrun. The next day, Colonel
Smith could assemble only 250 men, half his original force” (History 2006).
Prior to the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers and military planners focused primarily on
forecasting and organizing to fight against conventional Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in
Europe. This failure to effectively forecast Vietnamese insurgent capabilities and U.S.
counterinsurgency requirements ultimately led to U.S. failure in the Vietnam War (Krepinevich
Jr 2009). U.S. forecasting for conventional conflict in Europe later proved serendipitously
successful against, Iraqi forces, in the 1991 conflict of Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm (Atkinson 1993). Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks, the U.S. achieved stunning
victories in the opening phases of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to forecast the
changing nature of the conflict toward insurgencies once conventional operations ceased
(Gordon and Trainor 2012). This most recent failure resulted in sustained conflicts that cost
trillions of dollars and thousands of American lives (Shane 2018).
Forecasting is difficult; accurate ex-ante predictions stand in “stark contrast” to easier expost analysis (Frühling 2006:21). Clausewitz (1976:25) addressed the challenges of forecasting
when he wrote
This uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, this continual interposition
of chance, the actor in war constantly finds things different from his
expectations; and this cannot fail to have an influence on his plans.
Although we must admit it is never possible to predict events with absolute certainty, this should
not be used as justification for not forecasting, nor for excusing consistently bad forecasts.
Forecasts allow us to evaluate potential futures; identifying and remedying causes of inaccuracy
allows more-informed decisions with higher chances of success.
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Knowing the challenges of forecasting and the cost of getting them wrong, this research
examines the forecasting ability of military decision-makers. Military officers can be negatively
and positively influenced in their forecasts and subsequent decisions not only by individual
tendencies, but also by military institutional tendencies and habits. In undertaking this research,
I use qualitative research methods to answer my substantive research question: what is the
impact of military institutional tendencies and habits on US Army senior officer forecasting
accuracy?

Examination of Relevant Research
Before examining existing research, it is prudent to understand related definitions and
methodologies in this subject. Although forecasting is generally defined as “an estimation of
future situation…[and] an objective assessment of future course of action” (Bhatia 2019:1), the
disciplinary approaches to thinking about forecasting differ significantly.

Disciplinary Perspectives
Economists pioneered forecasting efforts to predict future market fluctuations and enable
informed investment and budgeting procedures (Diebold 1997, Hawkins 2005, Friedman 2013).
Most economists use macroeconomic models to represent the complex interaction of consumers,
producers, investors, and others in state and international economies. Individual actor attributes
are generally not considered since the focus is on the economic system. Economists have
focused significant effort on political risk forecasting- a discipline that attempts to foresee
hazards of political actions by host government and foreign opposition groups on international
businesses’ foreign ventures (Bunn and Mustafaoglu 1978, De La Torre and Neckar 1988,
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Goldstone, Bates et al. 2010). This research is somewhat limited by its focus predominately on
economic facets of society. To consider those societal factors as part of a forecasting effort, one
must consider other disciplines.
Political scientists and international relations theorists also attempt to develop forecasts
or predictive theories. Most social scientists acknowledge the difficulty of developing completely
accurate models, a prime example being the failure of Robert S. McNamara’s system-analysis
and cost-benefit predictions of North Vietnamese failure during the Vietnam War. This model
predicted that aggressive actions by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would incur mounting
losses on Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese army (NVA) forces, eventually exhausting
North Vietnam by 1968. As a result, the U.S. pursued a strategy of attrition and massive
firepower, with progress measured by enemy body counts. Unfortunately, the model incorrectly
misjudged North Vietnamese will; VC and NVA forces continued fighting past 1968, through
the U.S. withdrawal in 1973, until they captured Saigon in 1975 (Rejeski and Olson 2006:17).
McNamara admitted the complete failure of this forecast, and the devastation it caused to
American lives and civil society (McNamara and VanDeMark 1996, McNamara 2003).
Challenges such as strategic interactions, moral hazards, self-fulfilling and self-denying
prophecies, selection effects, and other phenomena create complex systems that cannot be
understood simply by examining each of its separate parts (Jervis 1998, George, Bennett et al.
2005: 130). Out of this complexity emerged theories such as balance of power, which forecasts
alliances in responses to an aspiring world dictator (Jervis 1998). Since the discipline is diverse,
social scientists use a wide variety of methods to test their theories. Both qualitative and
quantitative methods to determine tendencies of causality are generally accepted. Unfortunately,
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much social science forecasting simplifies human actions, improperly assuming aspects such as
rational decision-making and perfect information (Fearon 1995).
Psychologists attempt to forecast individual and group behavior and decisions by several
means. Cognitive psychologists have shown individuals “rely heavily upon our prior beliefs to
help [them] interpret new information and make sense of our ambiguous world” (Welch 2005:
37). Cognitive psychology scholars generally agree that humans think irrationally, relying upon
“inaccurate problem-solving procedures learned through experience, trial and error, peers or
parents, deliberate instruction” heuristics instead of rational choice decision-making processes
(Hastie and Dawes 2010:17, 88). Motivational psychologists theorize people forecast and make
decisions based on basic needs (Hull 1943). Most psychologist scholars use laboratory, field
experiments, and some case study methods to determine correlation between variables (McLeod
2003). These disciplinary perspectives, while useful in showing the human tendency toward
irrational forecast and decision-making methodologies, are limited to the individual level, and do
little to explain phenomena such as state and international organizational forecast-based
decisions.
Other research uses multidisciplinary approaches to make up for the individualdisciplinary weaknesses when explaining forecasting and decisions. The remainder of this
literature review first examines multidisciplinary forecasting research, next considers forecasting
as part of the decision-making process, and then examines how norms affect forecasting and
decision-making.
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Forecasting
Forecasting is important to policymakers at the strategic level. At the state and
international level, Frühling (2006) examined the importance of forecasting in the development
of strategy linking a state’s military actions and political objectives. State leaders forecast the
cause-effect relationship between potential military action and political success based upon
previous experience in war. Unfortunately, four sources of uncertainty often stymie successful
forecasting: aleatory uncertainty (randomness), nonlinearity and complexity, limited human
cognitive ability, and uncertainity in enemy actions (Frühling 2006). Adding to research which
examines the challenges of forecasting, Taleb (2010) examines the impact of “black swans,”
events that are extreme outliers and generally unpredictable. Examples of contemporary black
swan events include the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the attacks of 9-11. Although these
events are rare, the magnitude of their impact is enormous, making most strategic state-level
predictive models based on statistical probabilities ineffective.
At the individual level, Reiber (2004), examines intelligence analyst forecasts and finds
“outcome feedback,” or rapid feedback of whether an individual outcome occurs does not ensure
increased judgment about probabilities. Instead “calibration feedback,” which depicts a
combined overall trend comparing predictions to outcomes is more likely to improve accuracy in
forecasting. Other research suggests that a personality trait of “openness” prevents biased
judgments in intelligence analysis (Bar‐ Joseph and McDermott 2008). This research, while
valuable from a micro-perspective of intelligence analysis, does little to explain effective
forecasting techniques for a greater public audience.
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Tetlock (2005) attempts to remedy this when he combines economic, historical,
psychological, and political science techniques over a multi-year research program to identify the
personal attributes of superior forecasters. Extending from the zoomorphism originally
described by Greek poet Archilochus, he finds that “foxes,” those with wide ranging experience
and multidisciplinary education tend to forecast more effectively than “hedgehogs,” those with
specialized experiences and single-disciplinary education. More specifically, superior
forecasters tend to be more self-critical, appreciative of complexity, willing to revise estimates,
and willing to admit when they are wrong. Poor forecasters are doctrinal in their approach,
seeking simplistic patterns. They also tend to be vain, overconfident and willing to make bold
prediction and suffer from both self-attribution bias and hindsight bias. He later finds (2015)
some individuals are innately “superforecasters” when compared to others. These individuals,
though smart, are not geniuses. Superforecasting results from gathering evidence from multiple
sources, working in teams, using probabilistic methodologies, and changing predictions based
upon emerging evidence. He further found these traits could be enhanced with focused training.

Decision-making
As mentioned before, forecasting is part of the decision-making process. In Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1979, 1981) prospect theory, individuals are affected differently by risky choice
framing, in which individuals will choose options differently, based upon how they view risk for
each choice. Although framing per-se is not synonymous with forecasting, risky choice framing
experiments clearly show that individuals evaluate risk and benefit prior to making a decision.
Framing which promotes optimistic forecasting induces a choice different than those choices
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associated with more pessimistic forecasts.

Carnevale, Inbar, and Lerner (2011) find executive

leaders in U.S. state, local and federal government who engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive
activities, such as abstract thinking, without external motivation are less affected by risky choice
framing/forecasting and sunk costs, but still are affected by confidence calibration and risk
perception. Their research generally considers only internal perspectives, and neglects the
impact of external influences.

Military Decision-making
Research has demonstrated that military professionals and non-military personnel make
decisions differently. Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz (2006) compared decision scenario results
between mid-level military officers and college students. While college students were often
willing to choose a “do-nothing” scenario, the military leaders resoundingly chose action.
Haerem, Kuvaas, Bakken, and Karlsen (2011) examined junior to mid-level NATO military
officers to see if they follow Tversky and Kahneman’s general population prospect theory trends
when faced with choices framed by risk. They found these officers consistently made riskier
choices than general population trends. They also indicate initial findings that suggest that this
risk-taking decreases with level of education. Officers with more education appear to make less
risky choices.

The Effect of Military Institutional Tendencies and Habits
The U.S. military promotes strong institutional tendencies and habits, often significantly
different than those of the general society in the U.S. (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1964, Dunivin
1994, Feaver 1996, Feaver and Kohn 2001). Due to their extended time within the military,
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senior leaders are more likely to exhibit these institutional tendencies and habits. Because
institutional tendencies and habits affect forecasting as part of the decision-making process
(Rosen 1994, Allison and Zelikow 1999, Gartner 1999, Mintz, Redd et al. 2006, Haerem, Kuvaas
et al. 2011), it is likely that U.S. military institutional tendencies and habits do have some effect
on U.S. Army senior field-grade officer forecasting, decision-making, and success in combat.
Some of these institutional tendencies and habits, such as the requirement for discipline, and
importance of teamwork, could positively affect the forecasting, decision-making, and success in
combat. However other tendencies, as discussed further in this research, could negatively affect
this cycle.

Discounting Inconsistent Information
In cases of confirmation bias, or imperviousness to subsequent data phenomena, an
individual or group may feel a need for cognitive closure. Kruglanski and Webster define
cognitive closure as a “desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity”
(1996:264). A consequence of this need for closure is a tendency for urgency and permanence.
Urgency is an inclination to make decisions quickly. Permanence is a desire to maintain closure
by discounting information which may invalidate the decision’s logical foundation (1996:265).
This discounting tendency is characterized by actions that seek confirmatory evidence and
discount inconsistent information. Moreover, the desire for cognitive closure and permanence is
heightened by external stimuli such as dullness of task, time pressure, fatigue, value of a decision
by others, or simply if a decision on the topic is required (Kruglanski 1975, Kruglanski and
Webster 1996:264)
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Strategic-level military leaders are especially subject to urgency. State political leaders,
desiring the support of its general population, weighing the budgetary burden of sustained war,
and intent on ensuring political goals are achieved; will justifiably apply pressure on military
leaders to achieve rapid success on the battlefield (Feaver 1996, Cohen 2000, Feaver and Kohn
2001, Cohen 2012). Since the mid 19th century, advanced communications and press reports
rapidly disclosing battle events have provided up to the minute details and promoted this handson approach by state leaders.
U.S. Army commanders and staff are likely to show an institutional tendency to suppress
or ignore any information inconsistent with a developed plan. This situation, known in the U.S.
Army as “fighting the plan,” can occur if a commander and staff keeps his/her plan focused on
initial anchors despite emerging evidence which indicates a necessity to change (Kruglanski and
Webster 1996:265).
Additionally, a military leader may suppress inconsistent information out of a desire for
efficiency. Military leaders often prefer “formulaic solutions that reduce problems to
manageable terms, clarify responsibilities and calculations of capabilities I objectives, and
maximize certainty and efficiency” (Betts 1991:157). Deviational information “messes up” the
synchronized and well-resourced plan put in place at the beginning of the operation.
Because these conditions could promote some senior military officers to cling to the
developed plan, it could result in biased perceptions of subsequent unfolding events. Service
members are less likely to forecast enemy, friendly, or environmental deviational actions that
would throw the plan awry. Thus, rather than attempting to refine the military operation through
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updated forecasts, they anchor on the initial cues established at the beginning of the planning
process, potentially leading to disastrous results.
H1: U.S. Army leaders who discount inconsistent information are less likely to accurately
forecast future events
Neglect of Deviational Views
Similar to confirmation bias, individuals desiring cognitive closure may also display
consensus bias. Consensus bias is “a preference for consensual opinions that are unlikely to be
challenged and potentially undermined by significant others” (Kruglanski and Webster
1996:256). Those who suffer from closure:

Prefer to associate with similar-minded others, feel positively disposed toward
group members who facilitate consensus, and feel negatively disposed toward
dissenters or opinion deviates who jeopardize consensus. (1996:265)
Consensus bias is also likely in the U.S. Army, enabled by its hierarchical command
structure. A commander, responsible for all personnel within a unit, and the actions of it, almost
always demands support for a course of action once it is decided upon. Despite US Army
regulations which state “Soldiers are responsible to ensure that the commander is made aware of
problems that affect…mission effectiveness” (2008:2-2), commanders are often negatively
disposed toward dissenters or opinion deviators who jeopardize consensus (Kruglanski and
Webster 1996:265). Although a commander could appoint an individual or team to critically
appraise developed plans, in an effort to revise and improve them, this does not happen on a
consistent basis, and military doctrine does not direct this as part of the military planning
process.
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This negatively affects forecasting ability because focusing only on the most salient
possibilities and consequences while ignoring legitimate deviational information is indicative of
incomplete thinking (Hastie and Dawes 2010:33). Added to this, Tetlock (2005:85) has clearly
shown that superior forecasters are more likely to consider and integrate conflicting ideas; poorer
forecasters discount them.
H2: U.S. Army leaders who discourage dissenting opinions are less likely to accurately forecast
future events
Research Design
This article employs qualitative case study methodology to examine the impact of
military cultural norms on forecasting accuracy and decision-making effectiveness. To test these
hypotheses, I examine three senior U.S. Army commanders in three conflicts. First, I examine
General McClellan’s actions during the American Civil War’s Peninsula Campaign in 1862. I
next examine the actions of General Bradley during Operations Cobra to achieve breakout of the
Normandy region of France in 1944. I finish by examining General Petraeus during the Iraq
Surge in 2006-2008.
I chose these cases for several reasons. First, the rich archival resources, or interview
opportunities available for these cases make it possible to examine and draw from a trove of both
official and private correspondence. Unlike many general officers with only written biographies,
wide-ranging correspondence or interviews allow me to make a more balanced examination of
their actions. Second, there is significant variation in the independent variable; the decisionmaking and command personalities of the generals in each case differ strongly. Third, all three
have similar breadths of responsibility, each commanding at the army echelon of command, with
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subordinate corps and divisions. Lastly, in each conflict the commanders had strong influence
over operations, influencing them strongly in a positive or negative direction.
The unique circumstances leading up to each of these case study conflicts add strength to
my argument. However, these circumstances were not used as a selection criterion, since that
would select on the dependent variable, are. The failure and victory in all cases were unexpected
and the direct result of forecasting. Despite strong expectations that McClellan would win in the
Peninsula and capture Richmond (Sears 2015: 298), it did not occur because he consistently
over-forecasted Confederate strength. Similarly, most Allied leaders, including British General
Montgomery, believed that United Kingdom Commonwealth soldiers, not the Americans under
Bradley, would achieve the initial breakthrough at Normandy (Pogue 1954:188, Hastings
1999:231). Finally, many believed the situation in 2006 Iraq “grave and deteriorating” with US
forces having limited ability to influence events within Iraq (Baker III, Hamilton et al. 2006:6-7,
Sky 2016). The analysis in this paper will show instead that leaders were successful due to their
willingness to break confirmation bias paradigms by considering deviational information or
dissenting views. This willingness allowed superior forecasting that ultimately led to the success
of the underdog.

Tracking the Variables of Interest
In an effort to ensure I do not rely upon anecdotal data, I follow Talmadge’s (2015:34) technique
of using qualitative indicator questions to “provide context and to probe for the performance of
specific tasks.” As a result, when examining each case study, I ask the following:


Did the commander exhibit obvious bias going into the campaign?
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Did the commander develop a complex plan for the campaign? If so, was the commander
overly resistant to change of this plan?



Did the commander seize on confirmatory information or suppress contrary information
during the campaign?



Did the commander ignore dissenting opinions during the campaign?

Although the above qualitative indicators do not specifically measure the generals’
forecasting ability, their presence are indicators of institutional tendencies that negatively
affect his forecasting.

General McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign (1862)
McClellan’s forecasting ability was poor. He began the campaign with an overinflated estimate
of enemy strength on the Virginia peninsula and failed to refine it effectively over the subsequent
months of the campaign. Ironically, his extreme caution and slow methodical maneuver
provided both time and space for Confederate forces to reposition forces from other campaigns,
eventually allowing them to amass forces almost equal to McClellan’s initial force estimates.
McClellan’s forecasting failure was due to several factors, including overconfidence, bias toward
slow and methodical operations, ignorance of emerging intelligence contrary to his starting
estimate, and unwillingness to consider dissenting opinions

Background
McClellan’s received an engineering degree, as did all graduates at that time, from the
United States Military Academy at West Point in 1846. Although he dabbled in politics, his
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military and civilian careers generally remained specialized toward engineering, strategy and
tactics until his death in 1885.
McClellan began the war with several biases, including a resistance to emancipation of
slaves (Sears 2014), resistance to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan (Sears
1989), and professional disdain for President Lincoln (Waugh 2010) . Unfortunately, most of
them ran counter to that of the Federal administration, and particularly, that of President
Abraham Lincoln. To understand his resistance to deviational information and dissenting views,
we must first understand McClellan’s tendencies and preferred strategies for war.
First, McClellan was a detail-oriented planner. He was deeply interested the strategic
principles of Jominian military art, and received detailed instruction on it at the United States
Military Academy, from which he graduated, second in his class, in 1846. McClellan most
appreciated the military principles of mass and concentration, which he discussed in his
memorandum to Lincoln on August 4th, 1861. It articulated his interest in using “such an
overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing,
aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance” (Scott, Lazelle et al. 1901: Volume 1,
Ch 14, pg 7). This prescription of mass as a requirement for success influenced much of his
subsequent career. He felt it imperative because only massed forces could achieve the lopsided
coefficients of combat power necessary to “crush the rebellion at one blow [and] terminate the
war in one campaign,” (Scott, Lazelle et al. 1901: Volume 1, Ch 14, pg 8).
Second, McClellan was confident to the point of over-confidence (McPherson and Davis
1988:360). He felt himself exquisitely capable of leading Union forces to victory. He had
served very capably in the Mexican-American War, served as an American military observer in
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the Crimean war, and upon initiation of hostilities with the South, was called upon by the three
most important states of the North to command their forces (Sears 1989:1). In the late summer,
1861, following his assumption of command of the Union Army of the Potomac in August of
1861 (Beatie 2009:372), he reorganized its forces and took steps to significantly improve its
morale following the Union defeat at first Bull Run in July 1861. McClellan’s efforts earned
him the trust and adulation of the men of the Army and significantly strengthen the defense of
Washington DC from nearby Confederate forces south of the Potomac River (Sears and
McClellan 1988:111, 116). Positive press reports and adulations from his men led him to claim
in October 1861, that the Union Army will “fight under no one no one but [me]…I believe they
love me from the bottom of their hearts.” (Sears 1989: 112). Unfortunately, this vainness
resulted in the tendency to believe only he had true ability to achieve victory. He and members
of his staff often quickly dismissed derivations of his plans and alternatives to his opinions.

McClellan’s Overestimates
McClellan’s plan for the Peninsula campaign was built upon a faulty forecast that, when
combined with his desire for overwhelming odds, resulted in unnecessary caution. He predicted
the presence of a large Confederate force, numbering approximately 100,000, on the Virginian
peninsula that stretched from the Chesapeake Bay in the east to Richmond in the west.
McClellan based this assumption on the recent withdrawal of Confederate forces that had
previously threatened Washington DC from the south. He suspected that these forces were
positioned in and around Richmond, the Confederate capital. Unfortunately, his enemy estimate
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was reinforced by Allen Pinkerton, the Lincoln-appointed Union spy chief. Both had a tendency
to inflate their enemy estimates, although McClellan more so than Pinkerton (Fishel 1988: 126).
Shortly before and immediately after the landing on the peninsula, his subordinate
commanders provided their estimations of Confederate troops, which were accurate, numbering
at 15,000 to 18,000 (Rawson, Long et al. :Volume 1, Ch 7, pg 99, Scott, Lazelle et al.
1901Volume 1, Ch 63, pg 564). Unfortunately, McClellan ignored this contrary information.
McClellan’s Federal army, in reality, initially outnumbered his Confederate adversary’s force by
almost 100,000. A rapid drive from his initial landing spot to Richmond would have certainly
overwhelmed his adversary. Instead, McClellan forecasted that he had the “whole force of the
enemy on my hands, probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and possibly
more…[resulting in a Federal force] possibly less than that of the enemy” (Scott, Lazelle et al.
1901: Volume 1, Ch 23, pg 11). Even after receiving federal reinforcements, he continued this
trend, on May 14th reporting, “I must attack…a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers”
and asked “for every man the that the Department [of War] can send me” (Scott, Lazelle et al.
1901: Volume 1, Ch 23, 26).
Not only did McClellan discount information contrary to his plan, but he also seized on
fallacious reports that supported it. At multiple times during the campaign, McClellan would
inflate his enemy estimate and actions based upon the inflated testimony of captured or turncoat
Confederate soldiers while discounting accurate escaped slave testimony.

As an example, in

early April, four prisoners of the Confederate 14th Alabama reported that Confederate strength in
the peninsula was 40,000 but would grow in a few days to 100,000. These soldiers were likely
enemy moles, planted to seed disinformation (Sears 2014:43). Alternatively, an escaped slave,
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servant to an officer within the Confederate Army, reported the withdrawal of Confederate forces
from the eastern portions of the peninsula. Elements of McClellan’s personal staff discounted
this latter intelligence false; instead claiming they “had positive intelligence …that [the enemy]
were going to make a desperate fight there” (Congress 1863: 284) .
McClellan exercised extreme caution for the remainder of the campaign, and into
subsequent actions. During the May 31st Battle of Seven Pines, confederate forces initiated an
unsynchronized attack on federal forces that were separated by the Chickahominy River.
Although southern forces initially achieved success, federal reinforcements repositioned across
the river to stabilize union lines. Confederate General Johnson was wounded in the battle, and
McClellan could have decisively defeated southern forces in a counterattack, but chose not to.
Instead, as he wrote to Lincoln in a June 4th telegram “I have to be very cautious now” (Scott,
Lazelle et al. 1901: Volumme 1, Ch 23, pg 45).

McClellan Ignored Dissent, Leading to Lost Opportunities
In addition to discounting contrary information, McClellan consistently ignored or suppressed
dissenting views of his operations. McClellan’s attitude as he assumed command was summed
up in a letter to his wife on July 30th 1861.
All tell me that I am held responsible for the fate of the Nation & that all
its resources shall be placed at my disposal. It is an immense task that I
have on my hands, but I believe that I can accomplish it. (Sears 1989: 71)
He set about reinforcing his concept for the peninsular campaign using two methods, discounting
superior objections and suppressing those of subordinates.
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In a private meeting between McClellan and Lincoln on March 8th, 1862, the President
expressed concern that McClellan’s initial plans for an amphibious turning movement up the
peninsula would leave Washington DC uncovered from Union defenses. McClellan strongly
refuted the President’s concerns, declaring those concerns unnecessary (McClellan and Prime
1887:196). Unfortunately, McClellan’s plan of action in the peninsula ignored defense of the
Union capital. He (incorrectly) assumed that Federal forces, then engaged in the Shenandoah
Valley, could be recalled as defensive forces while others under his control conduct the
Peninsula campaign (Sears 2014:33). This discounted Lincoln’s clear directive to secure
Washington with strong and uncommitted forces. Based upon confederate threats that would
later evolve, Lincoln would later recall some of McClellan’s forces from the peninsula to ensure
the capital’s safety.
McClellan similarly suppressed his subordinates’ dissenting opinions both in planning
and action as the campaign unfolded. On March 8th, 1862, McClellan’s Chief of staff, General
Samuel Peter Heintzelman, quietly informed each general before the council of war that “there
was a strong effort to have [McClellan] superseded & that he would be unless we approved his
plan” (Sears 2014:5). Although several officers present disagreed with McClellan’s plan of
action, the majority supported it, and thus it carried the vote. His plan was subsequently briefed
to and approved by President Lincoln on March 9th. From this point forward, there was no
backing out of McClellan’s plan.
Upon landing on the Virginia peninsula at Fort Monroe, federal scouts identified
outnumbered Confederate forces. Despite this, McClellan twice restrained action that likely
would have ruptured the Confederate’s thin defenses, citing concerns with the size of his forces
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versus those of the Confederates. On the morning of April 6th, Heintzelman requested
McClellan’s permission to conduct a reconnaissance in force at an identified weak point in the
Confederate defensive line. He was denied by McClellan, citing overwhelming enemy odds,
and instead told to entrench his forces where they were (Sears 2014:42). That same day, General
William F. Smith, commanding a division on the east side of the peninsula, directed
reconnaissance of the weak Confederate line in preparation for subsequent offensive actions. He
recalled it upon receiving direction from McClellan to cease all reconnaissance pending
engineering evaluations of enemy defenses (Sears 2014:42).

Outcome of the Peninsula Campaign
McClellan’s actions remained timid for the duration of the campaign. Despite having a
three to one advantage over Confederate forces, he was quick to overestimate enemy strength
and result to logistics-heavy siege warfare, resulting in plodding advances versus lightning
maneuver. The result was a slow creep up the Virginia peninsula, allowing more than enough
time for Confederate leaders to reinforce defensive forces around Richmond (Sears and
McClellan 1988:211-212). The Confederate army consolidated and reinforced its lines around
Richmond then threatened McClellan’s flank with forces repositioned from the valley campaign
in the north. This eventually led McClellan to initiate Federal withdrawal procedures along the
peninsula and prevented any chance of an early termination of the American Civil War and
emboldened General Lee to later undertake bold strategies in support of the Confederacy.
In the planning for and execution of the Peninsula campaign, McClellan suffered from
both confirmation bias and a tendency to discount contrary information, resulting in egregious
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starting forecasts. These tendencies prevented him from updating his forecasts as the campaign
progressed and led him to discount information that ran counter to his expectation, most
importantly the small size of the defending Confederate force. As a result, he maintained
forecast of enemy forces at a number equal to or greater than his own, leading to a lockstep and
cautious series of operations that permitted ample time for the Confederate army to reposition
and consolidate forces, resulting in a Union defeat. Similarly, McClellan discouraged dissent.
All of these actions led him to forecast enemy actions based upon what he initially conceived
when he formulated the Peninsula campaign plan. This forecast was woefully mistaken, and
subsequently led to his defeat.

General Bradley in Operation Cobra (1944)
Unlike McClellan, General Omar Bradley was an effective forecaster. He began the
campaign at Normandy with a limited forecast, preferring to build, refine and extend it based
upon Allied and enemy progress on the battlefield. Prior to the Normandy invasion, Bradley
strongly objected to his higher headquarters’ phase line objectives designating long-term
progress expectations, likely due to beliefs (no doubt forged in North Africa) that accurate longterm forecasts of friendly progress versus enemy resistance were unrealistic given the tempo and
lethality of modern mechanized warfare (Hastings 1999:38). Although both US and British
commonwealth breakout operations were initially unsuccessful, Bradley was able use lessons
learned from them to build an accurate forecast of a viable course of action, that ultimately led to
the Allied breakout and follow on success. He did not suffer from confirmation bias, as
indicated by several instances in which he considered contrary information and alternative views,
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as well as promoted subordinate autonomy and initiative during the lead up to and execution of
Operation Cobra, the U.S. 21st Army’s breakout of the Normandy bocage in 1944.

Background
Before World War II Bradley spent much of his career, when not in command, either
teaching or pursuing education. He served twice as a professor at the United States Military
Academy at West Point and attended the Command and General Staff College and the Army
War College. More importantly, he served as an infantry tactics instructor under (then
Lieutenant Colonel) George C Marshall at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Of
note, many contemporary theorists consider the quality of instruction at the inter-war Infantry
school the zenith of American professional military education at the time and superior to that of
the Command and General Staff College or War College (Muth 2011:138).

Marshall best

sums up Bradley’s persona as “quiet, unassuming, capable, with sound common sense. Absolute
dependability” (Chambers 1999). General Dwight D. Eisenhower further describes him as
having “brains, a fine capacity for leadership and a thorough understanding of the requirements
of modern battle” (1943:3,11). As a result of this well-rounded perspective, Bradley tended to
consider all emerging events with objectivity; none were disregarded as unnecessary and needing
no response (Hansen 1944:4,6).
It also appears that Bradley, unlike McClellan, was not hamstrung in his forecasting due
to confirmation bias. In fact, the allied invasion of Normandy did not include a specific breakout
plan (Pogue 1946). Prior to the Normandy invasion, Bradley strongly objected to his higher
headquarters’ phase line objectives designating long-term progress expectations, likely due to
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beliefs (no doubt forged in North Africa) that accurate long-term forecasts of friendly progress
versus enemy resistance were unrealistic given the tempo and lethality of modern mechanized
warfare (Hastings 1999:38). Thus, the plans and execution of any breakout were to be based on
forecasts that Bradley, and his trusted subordinates, would develop in France as the battle
unfolded.
Bradley’s plan for the Normandy breakout, Operation Cobra, envisioned a narrow-front
attack by five American Army divisions southwest toward the western side of the Cherbourg
Peninsula (Hastings 1999:250, Zaloga and Bryan 2013:44). Bradley predicted that this type of
operation would crack the German defensive line, allowing Allied entry into the less constrained
interior of France, and allow a more rapid maneuver toward Paris and Germany. He based this
forecast on previous Allied broad-front attack failures Forecasting the array of enemy forces
and the type of American army operations that could successfully shatter its line required
Bradley’s full consideration of contrary information as well as consideration of alternative views.

Bradley’s Consideration of Contrary Information Enables the Breakout
Bradley fully embraced contrary information before, during, and after Operation Cobra. On June
3rd 1944, three days before the D-day landings, he acknowledged that his projected timelines to
seize immediate objectives in vicinity of the landing sites were “a little too bright [optimistic]”
(Hansen 1944:4,7). Following the June 6th landings and subsequent German actions to contain
the Allied beachhead, the American and British commonwealth forces rapidly stacked up,
requiring an expansion of the beachhead. Bradley knew that contrary to General George S.
Patton’s claim that a consolidated tank attack could “be in Paris in five days,” achieving this
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breakthrough would require infantry forces to “stand up…and slug it out” with the Germans
defenders (Hansen 1944:4,11).
Operation Cobra was the second breakout attempt by American forces. The first, a broad
front push, was launched July 3rd, 1944. Due to a combination of rushed planning, bad weather,
difficult terrain, and lack of aggressiveness by the American commanders, it failed (Bradley and
Blair 1983:269-271). Bradley would learn from this failure and correct these deficiencies in
Cobra on July 25th, by attacking on a narrower front using units and using commanders with
whom he developed trust during previous operations in north Africa (Hastings 1999:250). He
forecasted that this consolidated attack, along with concentrated aerial bombing, could disrupt
the disciplined German defenses and allow U.S. forces to exploit the rupture out of bocage
country.
On July 25th, following saturation bombing of a narrow area by Allied bombers, the US
First Army attacked. Although initially the German defending forces fought obstinately, by the
morning of the 27th German forces had withdrawn to hasty positions several miles to the
southeast (Williams 2011:180-183). Bradley was correct in forecasting that narrow penetration
of the German defensive front, followed by rapid exploitation, would set conditions for further
mobile war, so suited to the US mechanized forces. After the breakthrough was achieved, most
Allied leaders, including Bradly and Montgomery, forecasted that German forces would
gradually withdraw east to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier (Bradley and Blair
1983:288). This did not occur, due to direct orders from Hitler. Fortuitously, it created the
opportunity, first identified by Bradley, to trap significant numbers of German defenders in the
Falaise pocket, leading Bradley to remark “this is an opportunity that comes to a commander not
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more than once in a century. We’re about to destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way
from here to the German border” (Williams 2011:197). Unfortunately slow allied movement by
the encircling Canadian forces allowed many retreating German soldiers to escape (Hastings
1999:300-306).

Bradley’s Promotion of Alternative Views and Subordinate Suggestions
Bradley not only accepted, but expected subordinate dissenting suggestions to enable his
forecasting and decision-making. Bradley empowered his staff, who were “not afraid to make
decisions in his name…he backs them up” (Hansen 1944:4,7). While commanding II Corps in
Tunisia in 1943, staff officers suggested a reorientation of forces to achieve a breakthrough to
Bizerte, one of the final objectives of the Allied Tunisia campaign. Bradley fully considered this
recommendation, mulling the idea for several hours before finally admitting the suggestion as
“entirely possible...[despite] high risks” (Hansen 1943:4,7). The subsequent reorientation of
forces resulted in American success and seizure of Bizerte on May 7th, 1943.
During the planning for and execution of Cobra, Bradley always considered, and in many
cases implemented alternative suggestions. Following a 24 July suggestion by Major General
Collins, the US Seventh Corps commander, to add another American division to the attack, he
directed it immediately, despite the likely logistical challenges that would accompany it (Hansen
1944:4,11). Bradley ignored inter-service rivalries and followed the advice of the US Army Air
Corps aviator General Quesada, commander of the Ixth Tactical Air Command, to add US Army
Air Corps forward air controllers to armored tanks crews. From this vantage point they could
control close support aviation in support of frontline troops (Hastings 1999:271). In one of the
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most obvious examples of accepting subordinates’ alternatives, Bradley observed the
demonstration of a hedgerow-busting rhino modification to a Sherman tank, devised by an army
private and sergeant, and forecasted it a game-changer in Normandy; immediately directing it
applied to all tanks within his command prior to Cobra (Blumenson 2014 :206).

Outcome of Operation Cobra
As a result of Bradley’s superior forecasting of American and German actions and capabilities
during Operation Cobra, the Allied armies achieved breakthrough out of the restrictive bocage
terrain of coastal Normandy. The American Army, more mechanized than any other force in
World War II, could now exercise operations in a manner which favored its strength; mobile
warfare.
As a counter-factual to Bradley’s forecasting acumen was General Sir Bernard
Montgomery, the British commander of the Allied 21st Army Group and overall commander of
all Allied forces during the Normandy campaign. Montgomery predicted British forces would
capture Caen shortly after the Normandy landings, seeing it as a spot from which AngloCanadian forces could absorb German counterattacks as American forces captured Cherbourg
and then flanked German forces to south (Powers 1992:471). This did not occur; and rather than
refining his forecast, Montgomery clung to it. As a result, he felt he must capture it, rather than
refine his forecasts to acknowledge he could accomplish the same effect by maintaining fixing
operations north of Caen. Later during the US Operation Cobra, Montgomery directed a
simultaneous Anglo-Canadian operation titled Operation Goodwood, during which his British
forces would capture Caen. This operation proved both costly and unnecessary, resulting in
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numerous British tanks and lives destroyed by German forces (Urban 2005).

The results are

best described by Bradley, who in a LIFE magazine interview in 1951, stated “had
[Montgomery] limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it,
he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure”
(Bradley 1951:99).
Part of the success of Cobra was Bradley’s resistance to the military institutional
tendency of confirmation bias; specifically, the failure to adequately consider contrary
information or subordinate alternative views when updating his operational forecasts.
As demonstrated by this case study, Bradley exemplified this resistance before, during, and after
Operation Cobra. His non-confirming tendencies were fortuitous; his actions soon led to rapid
Allied advances across France and into Germany.

General Petraeus during the Iraq Surge (2006-2008)
Unlike the other case studies presented, this research of General David Petraeus is contemporary,
which creates unique opportunities. Since the Iraq surge remains a relatively recent
phenomenon, memories and personal perspectives of it remain fresh in the minds of those
interviewed. Only one of the key participants interviewed for this project have authored personal
memoirs of the Iraq war or the surge period. In order to ensure a balanced appraisal of the
situation, I took care to not only interview Petraeus and members of his “inner circle” trusted
aides and advisors, but also those with more nuanced views of General Petraeus’ leadership and
actions in Iraq (Figure 4). This allowed a critical examination, somewhat controlling for
personal affections or bias.
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Title

Name

Colonel
General
Ms.
Major General
Admiral

William Rapp
Pete Chiarelli
Emma Sky
David Fastabend
William Fallon

Relation to GEN Petraeus
Principal advisor
Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander, Mil. Advisor to SECDEF
Political Advisor to Multi-National Corps-Iraq
Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operation Officer
Commander, US Central Command

Figure 4: General Petraeus Case Study Interviews

Petraeus’ Forecasting Ability
Petraeus was an effective forecaster, though this was not readily apparent in early 2007. In early
2007 he “was unable to forecast whether or not the surge would be successful, but [he] was fully
committed to giving it a try” (Petraeus 2016). He began his command of the Iraq surge without
a well-developed forecast, instead choosing to build it based upon personal observations and
subordinate recommendations in theater. Similar to Omar Bradley, he was able use lessons
learned from them and opportunities that became apparent in 2007, including the Sunni
awakening, to initiate and then repeatedly refine an accurate forecast of a viable
counterinsurgency campaign that led to significant reductions in violence within Iraq by late
2008. Going further, Petraeus reinforced his demonstrated forecasting prowess, when he
correctly foresaw challenges with long-term maintenance of this peace. Since the drop in
violence was not matched by Iraqi ethnosectarian and political reconciliation, he acknowledged
that long term peace in Iraq “depended on how and when the Iraqis resolved the ongoing struggle
for power and control of resources and the various factions decided to work together” (Petraeus
2008).
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Background
General David Petraeus graduated in 1974 in the top 5% of his West Point class and
subsequently embarked on a unique military career in the U.S. Army. Unlike the stereotypical
single-track career path that most US Army Officers pursue, Petraeus mixed hard-nosed
assignments in light infantry combat units including the 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne with
academia, earning an M.P.A and Ph.D. from Princeton and later serving as an assistant professor
at West Point (Kaplan 2013). In addition to combat leadership assignments as captain, major,
and colonel, Petraeus also held key aide and assistant positions, serving in close proximity with
general officers far senior to his rank.
Prior to his time as the 2007-2008 Multi-National Forces- Iraq (MNF-I) commander,
Petraeus commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the early stages of the Iraq war in 2003.
During the initial occupation of Iraq following major hostilities, his division secured northern
Iraq for most of 2003. During the post-invasion US-management challenges, Petraeus operated
semi-autonomously from the often non-responsive Coalition Provisional Authority, “governing
the northern province of Nineveh in the way he saw fit…even conducting his own foreign
policy” (Sky 2015:72). There he practiced many of the counterinsurgency techniques he would
later publish in the U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual and oversee during the Iraq surge 2007-2008
(Ricks 2006:228-232).
General Petraeus returned to command all coalition forces in Iraq in 2007 armed only
with “the knowledge of the [US government-directed] surge, the knowledge that the US
president was backing him, and a commitment to counterinsurgency that [his subordinate]
warfighting commander, [Lieutenant General Raymond] Odierno had already embraced” (Rapp
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2016). He held no bias to a specific course of action beyond the philosophic desire to transition
coalition strategy toward counterinsurgency techniques(Rapp 2016:2).
In early 2007 he “was unable to forecast whether or not the surge would be successful,
but [he] was fully committed to giving it a try” (Petraeus 2016). In public, Petraeus’ initial
forecasts of how the surge would unfold were conservative, but not overly skeptical. In his
January 23rd confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee he remarked,
None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be neither quick nor
easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a determined,
adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact, any such
endeavor is a test of wills, and there are no guarantees…the way ahead will be
very hard…but hard is not hopeless. (Petraeus 2007)

The previous MNF-I strategy, overseen by General George Casey, was that of train and
transition; specifically, to train Iraqi security forces and transition security oversight to those
Iraqi forces as soon as possible. Unfortunately, this strategy was failing. Conditions in late 2006
Iraq were “grave and deteriorating”, with U.S. forces “caught in a mission that has no
foreseeable end” (Baker III, Hamilton et al. 2006). When Petraeus arrived in early 2007 to
assume command, President George W. Bush had already approved five reinforcing surge
brigades to arrive in Iraq in 2007-2008. Petraeus’ primary subordinate, Lieutenant General Ray
Odierno, the commander of Multi National Corps- Iraq, had arrived two months prior and
developed a tactical plan for the placement of these brigades, pending Petraeus’ approval.
General Petraeus, seeing no need to change it, readily approved Odierno’s tactical war-fighting
plan, acknowledging their agreement on COIN tactical employment principles (Rapp 2016:2,
Schlosser 2017:31).
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Petraeus’ philosophic desire for COIN in 2007 Iraq would prove appropriate, given the
circumstances. Petraeus had spent the previous 15 months in partnership with Marine General
(later Secretary of Defense) James Mattis developing the new U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine
and manual. Tasked by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff to “shake up the army,” his analysis and
development of counterinsurgency doctrine was wide-ranging (Petraeus 2016:1). Despite this,
Petraeus did not see the application of counterinsurgency techniques as rote application of ironclad doctrine, but instead a flexible application of existing military tactics to fit local conditions.
According to him
a counterinsurgency campaign is just merely a construct for a comprehensive
effort that includes offensive, defensive, and stability operations… The
predominant engagement is stability operations and [in] other places it might be
completely offensive and others where it might be mostly defensive as a
characterization (Petraeus 2016)
Upon arrival, he utilized a joint strategic assessment team (JSAT), composed of talented military
and civilian individuals including (then) Colonel H.R. McMaster, future National Security
Advisor and David Kilcullen, and Australian counterinsurgency expert, to conduct an in depth
four month analysis of the situation in Iraq and draft recommendations for his joint campaign
plan (Knowlton Jr 2010:6-7). His initial campaign focused only on the application of
counterinsurgency techniques and the use of the approved US surge forces to secure the
population; not discussed by this team was the opportunity provided by the budding Sunni
awakening in Western Iraq. Fortunately, his later consideration of deviational information and
alternative views allowed coalition forces to take advantage of opportunities soon afforded by
the Sunni awakening in Al Anbar (Fastabend 2016:1).
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Following the JSAT analysis, he developed a campaign plan in coordination with the US
Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker. This plan focused less on tactical details and more on
overall concepts and empowering subordinates to recognize and act on opportunities. He saw a
responsibility in getting the COIN “big picture right…,was very, very good at getting the big
[COIN] ideas right, and then repeating those messages, and getting those messages understood
all the way down the chain of command“ (Sky 2016). Simultaneously he understood the impact
of American political support. He was acutely “aware of the need to win support for the war
back in the US” (Sky 2016).
Lastly, he and Ambassador Crocker saw the use of US military forces to accomplish Iraq
political ends. They agreed to “use the coalition’s military operations and political advantage
both to bring Sunnis to the negotiating table and to force the Shi’a parties in power to end their
sectarian abuses” (Rayburn 2019:127)

Petraeus’ Consideration of Contrary Information Enables Security Improvement in Iraq
Petraeus’ initial conduct demonstrated his consideration of contrary information. Prior to his
arrival, In late 2006, the violence in Iraq had increased to a point where the majority of the
general public and most of Congress (including most Republicans) believed the situation in Iraq
was beyond salvage (Schlosser 2017:1). Many of the military in Iraq though the same; according
to the senior planner of the MNF-I staff
Things weren’t going well in Iraq. We had just lost the translator (US Army Specialist
Ahmed K. Altaie) who had left the green zone and were going through search procedures
to get him back. [Iraq Prime Minister] Maliki had raised hell on us blocking [sectarian
members] of the Iraqi Army…[MNF-I commander General] Casey brought us in and
asked what we thought of five more brigades in Iraq? I didn’t want to think about it. At
the time there was no justification to do it. (Fastabend 2016).
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Only a few months later, Petraeus took command, determined to turn the tide in Iraq. Petraeus
initially expected to focus primarily on providing population-based counterinsurgency security
using only coalition and Iraqi security forces. However, in late 2006 and early 2007, an
opportunity emerged. Several Sunni tribes in Al Anbar Province joined forces against Al Qaeda
and began cooperating with coalition forces (Knowlton Jr 2010:18). Previous efforts to partner
with Sunni tribes had failed (Biddle, Friedman et al. 2012:18), and Petraeus’ JSAT team did not
recommend investing in indigenous tribal security partnerships (Fastabend 2016:2). Fortunately,
LTG McCrystal, the commander of joint special operations in Iraq (JSOC) acknowledged in a
private meeting that targeting insurgent leadership by US and ISF special operations “cannot fish
this pond dry,” and recommended dialogue with Sunni tribal leaders to promote alliance with
coalition in forces (Fastabend 2016). Heeding this advice, and disregarding his JSAT team’s
initial advice, Petraeus personally travelled to Ramadi, in Western Iraq, to investigate firsthand
what these partnerships could provide. He subsequently fully supported programs to implement
what would later be known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI). However, he also foresaw challenges to
the partnership’s legitimacy. In a June 9th update to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, he
observed the need to “formalize the volunteers as quickly as possible by linking them with Iraqi
and coalition forces,” integrate them initially as SOI, and later as Iraqi security forces (Rayburn
2019:180). The subsequent SOI support program added over 100,00 tribal local security forces
to the counterinsurgency forces in Iraq, greatly enabling the decrease or cessation of violence by
2008 (Biddle, Friedman et al. 2012:36).
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Petraeus’ Promotion of Alternative Views Supports Military Success in The Surge in Iraq
Petraeus welcomed alternative views during his tenure as the MNF-I commander. He
surrounded himself with a highly educated and talented staff, fully acknowledging the
capabilities that an educated staff could assist him with. He desired staff members with
brains, a work ethic and the ability to get along with others. If [they] had the
brains they must be able to both analyze as well as communicate in writing and
verbally, to help me think through issues [and] to help me communicate my big
ideas and messages. (Petraeus 2016)

He also gauged operations on the battlefield by personally observing actions on the ground.
Based on this, he undertook a daily regimen of battlefield circulation tours, taking time to meet
with subordinate forces and the indigenous population. He used these trips not only to determine
what did/did not work in each battlespace, but also to ensure his strategic messages are passed to
and understood at the lowest level. Petraeus “had ways of pulsing at all different levels. He
wasn’t one of those leaders who would believe everything that was given to them on a power
point [slide]” (Sky 2016). As an avid consumer of information, he welcomed personal emails
from and participated in daily physical fitness with US Army captains, who were seven ranks
and at least four command echelons below his position as the MNF-I commander (Rapp 2016:4).
Subordinate initiatives that appeared promising were disseminated across the entire MNF-I
battlespace, thereby flattening tactic distribution.
Petraeus valued divergent perspectives and logical disagreement. When others expressed
views counter to his own, he would
try to persuade them to why I made my decision as I did...because if you
can’t persuade somebody, you have to acknowledge that you could be
wrong or that your ideas aren’t brilliant as you thought they were. This
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allows you to better refine. So, not only did I welcome, I actually
encouraged disagreement (Petraeus 2016)
Petraeus, in response to media criticisms that he and Ambassador Crocker provided
incorrect measures to depict the level of violence and progress in Iraq during his September 2007
congressional testimony, personally invited his critics to Iraq for review and feedback on MNF-I
metrics used to measure of levels of violence, progress in security, and other actions in Iraq.
Several key members of the media, authors, and theorists, including Thomas Friedman, Stephen
Biddle, and Ben Shapiro participated in a November 2007 two-day conference at his
headquarters. Based on their feedback, he validated some and adjusted other metrics (Rapp
2016). Although some critics saw this as a way to “co-opt them”, this conference benefited
Petraeus not only through its rigorous academic process, but also by improving his image in the
eyes of a skeptical media and providing a method to evaluate feelings in Washington DC and
academia (Sky 2016).

Outcome of the Iraq Surge
Petraeus presented subsequent forecasts of war progress in his September 2007 testimony to
Congress, where he was guardedly optimistic. In it he predicted that
based on [the decrease in ethnosectarian violence] and on the further progress
we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be
able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by
next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so
hard to achieve. Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains
complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is
possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be
neither quick nor easy. (Petraeus 2007)
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His last forecast was somewhat noncommittal. Petraeus knew that the increased security
situation in Iraq was not matched by Iraqi ethnosectarian and political reconciliation. When
asked when the war in Iraq would end, he replied “it depended on how and when the Iraqis
resolved the ongoing struggle for power and control of resources and the various factions
decided to work together” (Petraeus 2008).
As a result of Petraeus’ superior evaluation of the operational environmental and
recognition of opportunities, as well as his accurate assessment of their forecasted chances of
success, coalition forces, along with partnered Iraqi security forces achieved a significant
increase in local population security within Iraq. This security directly resulted in a dramatic
temporary decrease of violence in Iraq: over an 80% decrease in U.S. military casualties, and a
70% decrease in Iraqi civilian casualties, just between May and December 2007 (Biddle,
Friedman et al. 2012:7). These numbers continued to improve through the U.S. eventual
withdrawal in 2011.
Part of the security success of the 2007-2008 surge in Iraq was Petraeus’ resistance to
military norm-induced tendencies of confirmation bias; specifically, the failure to adequately
consider contrary information or subordinate alternative views when updating his operational
forecasts. As demonstrated by this case study, Petraeus instead relished any contrary
opportunities and alternative views and looked to capitalize on them by disseminating them
quickly across the entire Iraq battlespace.
Unfortunately, these effects were temporary. Security continued to improve through
2011, but a combination of Iraqi ethnic distrust and political turbulence, Iranian intervention, and
American war exhaustion combined to result in political discord, US withdrawal and the
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eventual rise of ISIS in Iraq. Petraeus was aware of this danger. Despite his close planning
efforts with the US Ambassador, the US was unsuccessful in achieving the overall strategic
political end state desired of the surge. Although military efforts “[bought] the time and the
space for the Iraqi governments to move forward with national reconciliation and the delivery of
public services,” the Iraqi government failed to deliver on these goals (Sky 2016). Some, close
to Petraeus, foresaw this problem, and advised that
It is not a military problem in Iraq…while the military certainly could help set
the conditions, at the end of the day it was a political problem. And until we
made progress in the political side, [the decrease in violence] numbers could
look as good as possible. And yet we weren’t getting anywhere…political
accommodations were not working (Rapp 2016)
Petraeus agreed, but saw this dilemma as not his issue. He saw his missions as “the military
problem; [the political issue was] up to the ambassador and the president [to solve]” (Rapp
2016). This reasoning, correct in US civil-military relations, proved ineffective in the complex
environment of Iraq and American political environments.

Conclusion
This qualitative research examined case studies of US general officers in combat to
determine if U.S. Army leaders who fall prey to military institutional tendencies and habits;
specifically discounting contrary information and discouraging dissenting opinions, are less
likely to accurately forecast future events. Case studies were selected using four criteria:
availability of information, significant variance on the independent variable, similarity in breadth
of responsibility, and the general’s strong influence over operations. Using qualitative indicator
questions, specifically examining if each general exhibited obvious bias, developed an overly
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complex plan, suppressed contradictions or welcomed/considered dissenting opinions during the
campaign, I have shown that generals with negative norm-induced attributes failed in their
subsequent campaign, even in the face of overwhelming advantage. Similarly, I’ve
demonstrated that general who resisted these attributes were successful, even in the face of
disadvantage.
This research strongly supports Tetlock’s (2015) theory that individuals who are more
self-critical, appreciative of complexity, willing to revise estimates, and willing to admit when
they are wrong, make more effective decisions. It also shows that leaders whom are more
willing to consider deviational information were less susceptible to Kruglanski and Webster’s
phenomena of “seize and freezing,” or an unwillingness to shift off a plan, regardless of any
contradictory conditions. (1996). Lastly, it appears that in the case of complex and everchanging
campaigns, it may be wiser to enter it with only a simple short range forecast to build upon rather
than attempt to refine an overly complex or far ranging forecast. Additional case studies could
strengthen this qualitative research and the population of study, US Army general officers, could
be expanded to included echelons one or more level lower, as well as to include other military
services in the US, or other international states.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
EDUCATION AND SUCCESS IN BATTLE
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has struggled in its role of implementing desired foreign
policy using military means. Contrary to earlier visions of a “new world order” in which the US
would peacefully supervise the expansion of opportunity and democracy throughout the world
(Bush 1990), it instead expanded its commitment of military forces into lengthy and large-scale
conflicts. The results of these conflicts were mixed. Since 1990, the US military was successful
in some post-Cold War conflicts (the 1991 Gulf War, the Bosnian/Kosovo Wars, the intervention
in Haiti). In others, US military actions culminated in stalemate and withdrawal (First
Intervention in the Somali Civil War 1992-1995). In still others, civil war followed the
withdrawal of forces (Iraq War, the American-led intervention in Libya)). The US military
remains committed in several ongoing conflicts that have uncertain foreseeable outcomes
(Afghanistan War, the American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria).
This wide disparity in intervention outcomes naturally raises question about what makes
some military operations more successful than others. Setting aside political machinations which
may influence these outcomes and focusing only on the military context, a place to start is by
examining the traits of the military commander responsible for leading the operations.
According to US military doctrine, the commander
Leads the fight, deciding what is to be done and when. He or she is concerned
with the larger goals of the organization, determining when new
circumstances dictate change, in accordance with broad conceptual direction.
(Thie 1994)
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The largest component of the US military, the US Army, believes that its leaders must have the
ability to “anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions” (Army 2015:5). Specifically,
foresight (forecasting ability) and adaptability (ability to adjust to new conditions) are crucial
attributes that commanders must possess to be successful in today’s complex military
interventions. These attributes allow leaders to identify circumstances, either opportunities or
risks, that should drive a change in operations in order to ensure mission success. The US
military attempts to develop these attributes through professional military education (PME) at
military schools and broadening experiences. Broadening experiences are assignments to joint
(other military services), interagency (other US governmental agencies), multinational (other
allied partners or, international, or nongovernmental organizations), or other non-military related
positions (Army 2015:5). These broadening experiences are assignments
outside [a military officers] comfort zone, where they cannot solely
leverage their own past experiences in the Army in order to excel and
where they are exposed to different organizational cultures and dynamics.
(Babcock-Lumish 2016:34)

A prime example of a non-military related broadening position is civilian graduate school.
According to Corarusso and Lyle (2014:111)
Adaptability stems from developmental programs that place people in
unfamiliar situations and require them to figure things out. Civilian
graduate education is a proven way to develop mental agility and
adaptability.
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Institutionally, the US military readily acknowledges the value of education. The US Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2009) policy on professional military education acknowledges that
education
fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives, critical analysis, abstract
reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative
thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems.

Despite this institutional commitment, principle and practice have diverged. US Army civilian
graduate school slots decreased dramatically at the end of the Cold War, from approximately
5,500-7,000 annual slots in the mid 1980s to fewer than 400 by 1995 (Colarusso and Lyle
2014:110). Contemporary numbers have not improved much beyond the 1995 level. Only 17
percent of US Army brigadier general basic-branch officer selectees from 2008 to 2016 attended
full time graduate school at a civilian university (Urben 2017:7). These officers provide the US
Army its high-level commanders.
This dearth of education was accompanied, or potentially caused, by a major
reorganization of the US Army officer management system. In 1996, the US Army officer
personnel management system (OPMS) XXI task force completed a yearlong study based on the
assumption that “officers do too many things today for them to excel at any one of them” (Urben
2017:1). Results of the study recommended that US Army officers, instead of alternating
between “specialized” jobs such as comptroller, strategist, and operations research, and
“operations” combat arms jobs including infantry, armor, field artillery and special forces, would
instead be permanently divided. “Specialized” or “operations” branch officers would remain in
these separate career tracts for the duration of their military career, with no opportunity for
assignments in the tract opposite. This reorganization created circumstance described by Betros
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(2012) and amplified by Spain, Mohundro, and Banks Spain, Mohundro et al. (2015) as “Athens
versus Sparta.” In this construct
Athens represents an institutional preference for intellectual ability, critical
thinking, education, etc. Conversely, Sparta represents an institutional
preference for motivation, tactical-ability, action-bias, diligence, intensity,
physicality, etc. Many in the Army may generally associate the Spartan
descriptions as more in line with the expectations of the combat-arms’
culture(s), and the Athenian descriptions as more in line with the
expectation of the other-than-combat arms culture(s) (Spain, Mohundro et
al. 2015:86)
Combat command positions within the US Army are limited to combat-arms operationsbranched officers (Spartans). Time pursuing broadening opportunities, such as civilian graduate
education, is “time away from the troops” and often viewed as an other-than-combat-arms
(Athenian) activity. This culture, has created what could be described as an anti-intellectual bias
amongst those who serve as US Army commanders.
This bias could not have developed at a worst time. Since 1990, US military
commitments have increased both in frequency and duration, while the percentage of
commanders with full-time civilian graduate school has decreased dramatically. Could the lack
of US military success be the result of a lack of critical thinking and adaptability due to mediocre
intellectual acumen amongst combat commanders? This paper examines how does commander
education affect success in military operation? It provides a quantitative examination of the
effect of U.S. Army Division Commander education on counterinsurgency effectiveness during
recent military operations in Iraq.
I research this question by first examining the relevant literature. Building on existing
research, I present my theory and results of quantitative analysis, which show a significant
relationship between the level of division commander education and the number of significant
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activities (SIGACTs) within their assigned areas of responsibility. I subsequently identify
additional research to fully support my theory and provide recommendations for the US Army

The Literature
The US military acknowledges (though does not necessarily promote) the value of
education in conflict decision-making. Despite this, the institution has not articulated a causal
mechanism tying education to success on the battlefield. Though examination of relevant
research I will attempt to remedy this. I begin with an examination of theories on warfare,
specifically focused on the role of the combat commander.
Sun Tzu prescribed a hierarchy of strategic objectives aimed at achieving political goals
with the least amount of military cost. The military commander, using general political
objectives provided by the state ruler, had the primary responsibility to recognize, attain and
maintain a position of advantage from which he could take action to achieve victory (Tzu
2008:77-84). Commanders should first strive to psychologically overwhelm an enemy and thus
capture his objective without damage to it or one’s own army. Short of this, a commander
should strive to capture an enemies’ army. As a last resort, a commander should capture an
adversaries’ cities (Tzu 2008:77).

.

Carl von Clausewitz (2004), a Prussian general influenced by the campaigns of the
Napoleonic War, stressed the psychological and political aspects of war. To him, military force
was an instrument used by a state to impose its policy (and will) upon another. In it, successful
commanders must use the constant re-evaluation process of dialectic methodology to identify
opportunities to mass against the enemies’ center of gravity for a decisive battle, despite
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incomplete and erroneous intelligence, unexpected developments, and the general fear imposed
by the “fog of war.”
Similar to Sun Tzu precepts in concept, both B.H. Liddell-Hart’s indirect approach and
John Boyd’s theory on maneuver warfare reject Clausewitz’s requirement to an army to mass on
its adversaries’ decisive point to annihilate the enemy. Instead, Liddell-Hart proposed the use of
the ”indirect approach” to strike at an enemies’ weakness with one’s own army’s strength “to
produce a decision without any serious fighting” by either dislocating, dissolving, or enabling
follow on destruction of the enemy (Hart 2008:324-325). Boyd (2017) similarly fused mental
and physical efforts in his strategy. Physical maneuver and attacks committed and overload an
enemies’ attention and strength while psychological warfare created an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty that paralyzed the adversary. In both theories command and control of the
maneuvering force was decentralized, enabling the commander on the ground to recognize
opportunities and take them quickly, allowing them to rapidly overwhelm the slower response of
the more centralized adversary.
Examining counterinsurgency theory, Nagl (2002) finds that counterinsurgency success
depends mainly on the organizational adaptability of the counterinsurgent force. Leaders of
these forces must constantly learn and change their tactics based upon changes in the operational
environment.

Theory
In all of these military theories, as well as the general doctrinal guidance of the US Army and
military, much of battlefield success depends on two primary attributes of a combat commander:
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1) an ability to recognize risk (to be mitigated) and opportunities (to act upon) and 2) a
willingness to modify the direction of military actions to take advantage of these opportunities.
Successful recognition of risk/opportunities requires effective forecasting, while a willingness to
modify actions requires a resistance to confirmation bias. Research has shown that both abilities
are affected positively by education.
When examining recognition, Tetlock (2005) finds that “foxes,” those with wide ranging
experience and multidisciplinary education tend to forecast more effectively than “hedgehogs,”
those with specialized experiences and single-disciplinary education. Additionally, the amount
of education matters; those with greater levels of knowledge, gained through higher levels of
education, are also better forecasters (Tetlock and Gardner 2015:109) Superior forecasters tend
to be more self-critical, appreciative of complexity, willing to revise estimates, and willing to
admit when they are wrong. Poor forecasters are doctrinal in their approach, seeking simplistic
patterns. They also tend to be vain, overconfident and willing to make bold predictions, and
suffer from both self-attribution bias and hindsight bias (Tetlock 2005). Forecasting allows a
commander to continually observe and assess the environment, discount incomplete and
erroneous data (war fog), and mentally war game possible friendly and enemy scenarios. As a
result, opportunities on the battlefield are more readily apparent to the superior-forecasting
commander; he has most likely already “gamed” the outcome and can quickly decide whether to
act upon or discard the opportunity.
To modify the direction of military actions, the leader must be willing to change. In cases
of confirmation bias, or imperviousness to subsequent data phenomena, an individual may feel a
need for cognitive closure and resistance to change. Kruglanski and Webster define cognitive
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closure as “an individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward
ambiguity” (1996:264). A consequence of this need for closure is a tendency for urgency and
permanence. Urgency is an inclination to make decisions quickly. Permanence is a desire to
perpetuate closure by discounting information which may invalidate the decision’s logical
foundation (1996:265). This discounting tendency is characterized by actions that seek
confirmatory evidence and discount contrary information. Commanders suffering from
confirmation bias would likely suppress or ignore any information inconsistent with a developed
or existing plan. This situation, often described as “fighting the plan,” can occur if a commander
keeps his/her plan focused on initial anchors despite emerging evidence which indicates a
necessity to change (Kruglanski and Webster 1996:265). Research has shown that increased
education, especially if it includes the awareness of the cognitive fallacies involved in
confirmation bias, can mitigate against it (L Ross 1980:191).

Since most, if not all, advanced

civilian graduate degrees include education on the pitfalls of logical fallacies in academic
research, it follows that individuals with these degrees are more insulated against this bias.
Going further, increased education positively effects the interaction of these two leader
attributes. The causal mechanism that interacts forecasting (perspectives in which one identifies
risks or opportunities) with a modification of actions (willingness to change direction) is a
decision. Specifically, a leader mulls the former, decides and implements the latter. Research has
shown that education improves general rationality in making decisions (Huffman 1974, Kim,
Choi et al. 2018).
My theory is that battlefield success depends on the critical-thinking ability of the
military combat commander. These forces must constantly learn and adapt based upon changes
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in the operational environment (Nagl 2002, Nagl and Flournoy 2007). Battlefield success
depends on: 1) an ability to recognize opportunity/risk and 2) a willingness to modify the
direction of military actions to take advantage of these opportunities; acted upon through the
causal mechanism of the decision. Since forecasting, resistance to confirmation bias, and
effective decision-making are all positively influenced by increased education (Huffman 1974, L
Ross 1980, Tetlock 2005, Tetlock and Gardner 2015, Kim, Choi et al. 2018), my primary
theoretical insight is that leaders with higher levels of civilian education are more likely to
achieve success in military conflict. My hypothesis to test this theoretical argument is:
H1: Military commanders with higher levels of civilian education are more likely to achieve a
decrease in reported significant activities (SIGACTs).
Research Design
My research methodology regresses individual division commanding general’s education levels
against reported significant activities within each of their assigned battlespace in Iraq. My unit of
analysis for this research is U.S. Army division commander/month from January 2004 (general
initiation of insurgency) to December 2008 (termination of the “surge” in Iraq). Division-level
commanders are senior U.S. Army officers (Major Generals) with approximately 30-35 years of
Army service, who command one of ten U.S. Army combat divisions. I chose this echelon of
officer because all began their service prior to the end of the Cold War and the implementation
of OPMS XXI. They thus had the equitable option of pursuing generalized and/or specialized
jobs within the US Army, as well as advanced civilian education, unconstrained by the
perception issues induced by the “Athens versus Sparta” dilemma, or the significant decrease in
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advanced civilian education slots. This allows a much greater level of diversity in my
explanatory variable.
Major Generals are selected for command of US Army divisions in a manner specified by
United States code (U.S.C.). Initial selections are made by a board of US Army four-star
Generals. Those recommendations are then reviewed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA),
who then gains concurrence from the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Department of
Defense, and US President. They are ultimately confirmed by the US Senate. Almost always,
Division commanders will have previously served as an assistant division commander (two
assigned to each division), prior to their selection to division commander. Division commanders
are overwhelmingly chosen from the combat arms branches of the US Army.
Structurally, a US Army division is composed of a headquarters and 5-7 subordinate
combat maneuver, aviation, artillery, and support brigades that roughly total 15,000-20,000
soldiers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, division level-headquarters and subordinate brigades
often deployed separately to Iraq. In the Iraq theater of operations, division headquarters were
termed multi-national divisions (MNDs), to account for the small, and often token, foreign
coalition forces that were often assigned under the divisional command’s command and control
structure. Division Headquarters were assigned to specific MND locations not as a result of the
personality or education of the MND commanding general, but instead by the amount of time
between deployments, as most division headquarters organizationally deployed from home
station to Iraq two to three times between 2004-2008 (each time with different commanding
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generals).4 MNDs were task organized within the timespan examined in this research, with the
in-theater division commander leading 3-8 subordinate armored, Stryker, or infantry combat
brigades from either their own or another division.
MND Commanders were especially important in Iraq due to their impact and influence
on the battlefield. Unlike the next higher level of headquarters (Multi National Corps-Iraq
(MNC-I) or Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)), These commanders focused downward to the
tactical fight. Their day to day interactions with subordinate commanders at the brigade (one
level down) and battalion (two levels down) allowed them to focus exclusively on the unique
environment of their assigned MND battlespace, generally free from the distraction of interaction
with civilian policymakers.

These commanders typically issued guidance and directives several

times a week, directly impacting the actions of 15-25 subordinate battalions. MND commanders
owned and allocated enablers including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), rotary assets (helicopters), and other scarce
battlefield enablers. Division commanders also hold general courts-martial convening authority,
meaning they have the authority to convene a military trial that could ultimately result in the
death penalty, life imprisonment, or a dishonorable discharge for all enlisted, non-commissioned
and commissioned officers within the MND.
Since this research focuses exclusively on the education and performance of US Army
general officers, I did not include data for the US Marine Corps divisional equivalent unit in Iraq
(Multi-National Force West) nor that of British (multi-national division southeast) or Polish led

Information based on 3 April 2019 personal discussion with US Army Lieutenant General
Jeffrey Buchanan
4
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organizations (multi-national division central-south). The USMC, British, and Polish officer
development, promotion, and education process are significantly diverse and would thus likely
invoke skewed results in my final analysis.
The US Army general-led MNDs considered for this research included MND-Baghdad
(Jan 2004-Dec 2008), MND-north central/north (Jan 2004-Dec 2008), MND-northwest (Jan
2004-Dec 2005), and MND-central (Apr 2007-Dec 2008). The varying periods of time
considered were due to changes in MND-assigned battlespace. In January 2006, MNDnorthwest (at times also named Task Force Olympia and Task Force Freedom) was absorbed into
MND-north central battlespace. The resulting expanded MND battlespace was from then on
known as MND-north. Similarly, as part of the 2007 troop surge, an additional MND
headquarters was added to the OIF theater; its assigned battlespace, previously part of MNDcenter south, was designated MND- center. During the span of January 2004-December 2008, a
total of 18 US Army generals commanded these MNDs in Iraq. The source of MND boundaries,
as well as the generals who commanded them, is the Operation Iraqi Freedom digital archives
maintained at the US Army Center of Military History at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington
D.C.

Dependent Variable(s)
Measuring military success in a counterinsurgency conflict is difficult. Some research has
suggested use of state regime stability (Goldstone, Bates et al. 2010), but that measure examines
overall state political soundness, going well beyond a military counterinsurgent’s
responsibilities. Comparisons of US to enemy combatants killed was heavily criticized as a
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measure of the Vietnam War progress (Krepinevich Jr 2009). Similarly, simply measuring the
number of enemy insurgents killed or captured is not appropriate, since estimates of insurgent
populations are often inaccurate (McChrystal 2014). According to US counterinsurgency
doctrine (Army and Corps 2010:122-123) to be successful, counterinsurgent forces must
Protect the population…[by] continuously conduct[ing] patrols and [using]
measured force against insurgent targets of opportunity. Contact with the
people is critical to the local COIN effort's success. Actions to eliminate the
remaining covert insurgent political infrastructure must be continued; an
insurgent presence will continue to threaten and influence people

From this requirement, an accurate and effective dependent variable must measure both
protection of the population and elimination of insurgent forces. The number of casualtyproducing attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and the civilian population meet these
requirements by measuring: 1) how successful US and Iraq security forces are at protecting the
local population from insurgent attacks, and 2) if insurgents can conduct effective attacks against
counterinsurgents and the civilian population. Therefore, successful counterinsurgents will see a
decrease in casualty-producing attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and the civilian
population. Trends from these type of events were used by General Petraeus to measure progress
in Iraq during 2007 Congressional testimony ((GAO) 2007). A robust dataset exists that
provides this; the still-classified MNF-I dataset released to Wikileaks in 2010. Although some
academic research has made use of this dataset (Donnay and Filimonov 2014), US government
policy prohibits and general academic consensus limits its general use (Defense 2011,
O'Loughlin 2016). This dataset contains coalition, ISF and civilian casualty statistics. Pending
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declassification, which has been requested to US Central Command by several individuals, I
must use other data sources for my dependent variable.
Due to an inability to use the above-described variable, I instead used coalition-recorded
reported incidents that occurred in Iraq. The primary dependent variable (Iraq SIGACTs) is the
total number of monthly incidents recorded in the Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) SIGACT
III database for the Iraqi governorates corresponding to the of-interest MND boundaries. Source
of this data is the Empirical Study of Conflict (ESOC)- Iraq Civil War Dataset version 3.0, coded
by Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2013). These SIGACT reports contain events which affected
“coalition, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government
organizations ” ((DOD) 2008). As an alternate DV, in accordance with Gartner’s (2008)
research methodologies, I also considered a change-value of this variable (Change in SIGACT).
This variable was used in peer-reviewed academic research (Berman, Shapiro et al. 2011,
Shapiro and Weidmann 2015) to measure success in the Iraq counterinsurgency.
Admittedly, this data has some limitations and potential effects. Coded as they are in the
ESOC dataset, SIGACTs are an imperfect measure of success in a counterinsurgency conflict.
The ESOC SIGACTs cover a wide swath of events. They include both negative events (IED
detonations, rocket attacks, gunfire attacks, etc.), as well as what could be judged positive events
from a counterinsurgent perspective (an IED discovery resulting from a local resident identifying
it to patrolling US soldier). Additionally, Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) readily admit the
limitations in the data, including inconsistencies in data coding and probable measurement error.
Most importantly, since it only captures events that occur when US forces are present, it
approximates US presence amongst the population. As a result, an in increase in SIGACT may
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be due to a higher US and Iraqi security force presence amongst the population, rather than
higher insurgent activity or effectiveness. As a result, I predict that an increase in SIGACT
reporting indicates more successful application of COIN principles and thus more success.

Explanatory Variable
Since a greater level of higher education promotes effective forecasting and reduces the
tendencies to rely upon heuristics (Tetlock 2005)(L Ross 1980), my primary explanatory variable
of interest is US Army MND commander level of education (Commander Education). For this
measure, I consider the level of education completed and number of degrees awarded, as well as
three other factors (figure 1). First, I consider the quality of school. Tier I civilian schools,
specifically those that rank in the top 20 nationwide (Colleges 2010), score higher on my scale.
Additionally, since a wider-ranging education (different versus same discipline) improve
forecasting and subsequent decision-making, those officers with degrees of varying disciplines
score higher (Tetlock 2005). Lastly, civilian fellowships, though perhaps not degree-awarding,
generally provide a rigorous academic experience, hence I include them.
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Scale
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Education Level
BS/BA - single major
BS/BA- double major, different disciplines
Single MS/MA- Tier II school, same discipline
Single MS/MA- Tier II school, different disciplines
Single MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier I school, same discipline
Single MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier I school, different disciplines
2 or more MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier II schools, same disciplines
2 or more MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier II schools, different
disciplines
2 or more MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier I schools, same disciplines
2 or more MS/MA/civilian fellowship- Tier I schools, different
disciplines
Ph.D. same discipline
Ph.D. different discipline

Figure 5: Education Level Scale of MND and Subordinate Brigade Commanders

Since a key objective of counterinsurgency operations are to reduce violence (Defense
2018:xiii), I expect a higher level of education to improve a commander’s ability to forecast
effectively, identify risks/opportunities, and modify the direction of the MND’s actions to meet
counterinsurgency success criteria. Thus, I expect higher education to correlate with decreases
in violence. Counterinsurgency flow of units and commander names were determined via
archival research of Operation Iraqi Freedom digital archives maintained at the US Army Center
of Military History at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C. Division commander levels of
education were determined through data queries of open-source military and biographies
available on the worldwide web.
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Controls
Although division commanders entered the US Army before the end of the Cold War, many
subordinate combat brigade-level commanders did not, and thus were fully affected by the
“Athens versus Sparta” phenomenon. Combat brigade commanders hold the rank of US Army
Colonel, have approximately 20-24 years of service in the military, are combat arms, and are
selected using processes similar to division commanders. Brigade commanders typically
commanded 2-5 subordinate battalions, and their impact and influence were significantly smaller
than that of the MND commander. Despite this, these subordinate commanders were responsible
for carrying out the guidance of the MND commander, as well as identifying opportunities and
recommending actions to their MND superior. Fort these reasons, I also consider the collective
MND-subordinate brigade commanders’ education (Subordinate Education). I did not include
aviation, artillery, and support brigade commanders since these types of brigades did not execute
the daily face-to-face interaction with the population, Iraq security forces, or insurgents that
maneuver brigades did. I expect, like my primary hypothesis that an increase in education will
result in decreased SIGACTs. I do this for each combat brigade commander using the same
scaled methodology as used in my primary explanatory variable. However, since each of the 3-8
subordinate combat brigades per division could be different each month, each generally
conducting a 12-15-month deployment offset from other brigades, I average the combined
subordinate brigade commander education levels to a single monthly value per MND. Like my
IV, the flow of units and commander names were determined via archival research of Operation
Iraqi Freedom digital archives maintained at the US Army Center of Military History at Fort
Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.. Brigade commander levels of education were determined
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through data queries of open-source military and civilian biographies available on the worldwide
web.
The second control (US COIN) is the number of US service members per MND
battlespace conducting counterinsurgency tactics. Previous research considers ratios of
counterinsurgents to insurgents (Thompson 1966, Galula 2006, Joes 2006) or to the indigenous
population (Quinlivan 1995, Quinlivan 2003, Budiansky 2004, McGrath 2006, Biddle, Friedman
et al. 2012). Only a portion of the soldiers deployed to Iraq actually left the protection of
military bases to conduct counterinsurgent activities. The rest provided indirect support such as
logistical, aviation, indirect fire, or administrative services and should not be considered
counterinsurgent forces. From detailed orders of battle gleaned from the Operation Iraqi
Freedom digital archives maintained at the US Army Center of Military History at Fort Lesley J.
McNair, Washington D.C., I determined the battalion composition of each brigade and used the
values depicted in figure 2, rounded values from US Army battalion tables of organization and
equipment (TOE), to estimate the number of COIN-executing soldiers per brigade and MND
conducting operations in Iraq per month. Like the theorists cited above, I expect that an increase
in COIN-executing soldiers will result in decreased SIGACTs.
COIN Soldiers
700
500
450
600
500
400

Type of Unit
Airborne, Light, Stryker Infantry Battalion
Airborne, Light, Stryker, Armored Recon Squadron
Armored/Light Cavalry Regiment, Division Cavalry Squadron
Mechanized Infantry Battalion
Combined Arms Battalion
Armored Battalion

Figure 6: Counterinsurgency Soldiers Within a US Army Brigade
Source: US Army modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE)
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A third control, (ISF) is the logged total number of trained Iraqi security forces,
composed of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police, throughout Iraq per month. Source of this data is
Operation Iraqi Freedom digital archives maintained at the US Army Center of Military History
at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C.. Similar to my second control, this controls for
theories that equate counterinsurgency success primarily to a higher ratio of counterinsurgents to
insurgents (Thompson 1966, Galula 2006, Joes 2006) or to the indigenous population (Quinlivan
1995, Quinlivan 2003, Budiansky 2004, McGrath 2006, Biddle, Friedman et al. 2012).
inconsistencies in reporting by MND units prevents accurate MND-level values. For this
research, Iraqi Forces are gross values per month, Iraq wide. Similar to my previous control, I
expect increased Iraq security forces to correlate with decreased SIGACTs.
Critical events, such as elections, large-scale (brigade-size or greater) military actions by
counterinsurgent forces, insurgent attacks (or perceptions of attack) which either generated more
than 100 casualties or ignited significant ethno-sectarian strife, and other strategic political
events often resulted in spikes in SIGACTS. Some events resulted in SIGACTS limited to the
region or MND in which the event occurred, while others triggered nation-wide violence. To
acknowledge these critical events, detailed below in figure 3, I add a fourth control (Critical).
An interval value listing the number of these types of operations in a reporting cycle. Those
events with limited resultant violence are annotated with the effected MND in parenthesis.
Values are lagged one month since the resultant violence is not instantaneous. Source for these
events are multiple historical examinations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Wright and Reese 2008,
Knowlton Jr 2010, Gordon and Trainor 2012, Mansoor 2013). I expect an increase in critical
events to be correlated with increased SIGACTs.
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2004

2005

MAR- Shi'a festival of Aashurah

JAN- Iraqi legislative elections

MAR- 1st battle of Fallujah

APR- battle of Abu Ghraib (B)

OCT- battle of Samarrah (N)

AUG- Baghdad bridge stampede
(B)
SEP- battle of Tal Afar (NW)

NOV- second battle of Fallujah

DEC- Iraqi elections

AUG- battle of Najaf

2006
FEB- Al Askari mosque bombing
JUN- Operation Together Forward
(B)
JUL- Op River Falcon (B)
DEC- Diyala campaign (N)
DEC- Saddam Hussein executed

NOV- battle of Mosul (NW)
2007

2008

JAN- battle of Najaf II

JAN- OP Phantom Phoenix

MAR- battle of Baqubah (N)
JUN- Al Askari mosque bombing
II
JUN- OP Phantom Thunder

JAN- Ninewah campaign (N)
MAR- battle of Basrah
JUL- OP Iron Pursuit (N)

AUG- OP Phantom Strike

Figure 7: Critical Iraqi Events Resulting in Violence

Results
Since both explanatory and dependent variables were interval values, all models were estimated
using OLS linear regression with the MND held as the panel variable, the month as the time
variable. The results of my analysis are depicted below in table six and seven. Table six
regressions were run with the DV “change in SIGACTs” per month, table seven with “total
SIGACTs” per month.
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Variable Type

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Commander Ed.

Ordinal

162

6.074

2.599

1

11

Subordinate Ed.

Interval

162

7.461

1.294

4

10

US COIN Soldiers

Interval

162

7681.42

3296.705

2100

16800

Iraqi Sec. Forces (log)

Interval

162

276855.6

126815

100000

454000

Critical Event

Ordinal

162

0.309

0.571

0

2

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

MND
CDR

Ed.
Level

SIGACT
Avg.

Dempsey

10

257

Odierno

8

106

Petraeus

11

85

Chiarelli

8

721

Ed. Level

SIGACT
Avg.

Batiste

4

447

1-4

615

Ham

4

210

5-8

938

Webster

3

796

9-11

101

Taluto

1

586

Rodriguez

7

296

Thurman

4

1730

Turner

8

1010

Fil

8

1591

Mixon

8

1796

Lynch

9

63

Hammond

3

512

Huertling

8

1051

Oates

4

25

Figure 8: Summary Statistics

Multiple OLS regression iterations resulted in mixed results for my primary explanatory
variable, commander education. Although all table six (change in SIGACTs) coefficient results
trend in accordance with my hypothesis, none were significant, despite multiple combinations of
control variables. Additionally, the extremely low adjusted R2 scores in all regressions indicate
that little of my input variables explain the variation of my output.
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Table seven (total SIGACTs) commander education coefficients show strong
relationships between higher education and increased SIGACTs. Additionally, adjusted R2
scores are much higher. Interestingly, all three of the four regression coefficients are significant
at the .00 level. This research supports an the hypothesis that “Military commanders with higher
levels of civilian education are more likely to achieve higher levels of recorded significant
activities in their areas of responsibility.”
A more nuanced examination of COIN doctrine explains this alternative hypothesis.
From the perspective of commander attributes, more-educated commanders are more aggressive
than less educated counterparts, understanding that a prime tenet of counterinsurgency is to
actively live amongst and secure the civilian population. A commander’s directive for more
presence by his subordinates will create a greater opportunity for US Army soldiers to observe,
and hence report and document significant activities in sector.
In potential issues with the data, we must consider this research’s primary
dependent variable and the dataset from which it is sourced. Coded as they are in the ESOC
dataset, SIGACTs are an imperfect measure of success or failure in a counterinsurgency conflict.
The ESOC SIGACTs cover a wide swath of events. They include both negative events (IED
detonations, rocket attacks, gunfire attacks, etc.), as well as what could be judged positive events
from a counterinsurgent perspective (an IED discovery resulting from a local resident identifying
it to patrolling US soldier). Unfortunately, SIGACTs fail to accurately measure how successful
US and Iraq security forces are at protecting the local population from insurgent attacks, and if
insurgents can conduct effective attacks against counterinsurgents and the civilian population.
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Other control variables similarly trend opposite of my expected direction. Although
some variable coefficients in table six (Change in SIGACTs) trend in my predicted position, I
discount this entire model because none of the adjusted R2 results are large enough for serious
consideration. In table seven, subordinate education coefficients are significant, but like my
primary explanatory variable, trend opposite of what I predicted, most likely for the same
reasons I outline above.
The number of US soldiers conducting counterinsurgency actions are also significant in
two of the four considered regressions, but all four results trend opposite from what I predicted.
The likely reason is fairly intuitive: a larger number of troops will likely result in a larger number
of significant activities reported.
The number of Iraq security forces control variable is considered in two of the four
regression and one of its results are significant, but both trend opposite of what I expect. This
trend likely similar to the others already mentioned. ISF soldiers and police often accompanied
US forces on patrol, and later developed their own reporting process that allowed them to
provide input to SIGACTs. Therefore, more of them resulted in more SIGACT generation.
Lastly, critical events were insignificant, but trended as I expected.
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Table 6: Effect of Division Commander Level of Education on Iraq Change in SIGACTs 2004-2008

Variables

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4

Commander
education

-1.0680
(6.66346)

-3.6518
(6.64542)

Subordinate
Education

16.0211
(16.25985)

18.0375
(16.44326)

US COIN
Soldiers

-.00433
(.00942)

-0.0129
(.00870)

Iraqi Security
Forces

-.00038*
(.00017)

Critical
Events

-42.19118
(28.90271)

-1.4173
(6.58619)

-4.6756
(6.61842)
15.99561
(16.41271)

-0.0046
(.00953)

-0.01208
(.00871)

-85.6491*
(43.05349)
-38.97102
(29.23746)

N
162
162
162
162
Adjusted R2
.0149
-.011
.004
-.016
________________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Table 7: Effect of Division Commander Level of Education on Iraq SIGACTs 2004-2008

Variables

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4

Commander
education

36.14529*
(15.76178)

42.5209**
(15.74333)

Subordinate
Education

111.5822**
(38.46107)

106.6066**
(38.94897)

US COIN
Soldiers

.041525
(.022283)

.062751**
(.02062)

Iraqi Security
Forces

.00094*
(.000403)

369.9593
(100.9939)

Critical
Events

71.0308
(68.36652)

63.0922
(69.25446)

40.7745**
(15.4497)

44.1783**
(15.62927)
109.9123**
(38.75830)

.0209
(.02236)

.0614**
(.02055)

N
162
162
162
162
Adjusted R2
.450
.434
.453
.435
________________________________________________________________
Data in parenthesis = standard error
*- Significant at .05 **-Significant at .01 ***-Significant at .00 All tests are two-tailed
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Conclusion and future research
This research highlights the challenges with measuring success in war. Although it shows the
strong relationship between education and SIGACT reporting, it fails to completely answer my
primary research question how does commander education affect success in military operations?
More research is needed to fully answer this question. The first step of this should be to
use a dependent variable that more accurately measures conflict success or failure, specifically
measuring how successful US and Iraq security forces are at protecting the local population from
insurgent attacks, and if insurgents can conduct effective attacks against counterinsurgents and
the civilian population. A robust dataset exists that may provide this; the still-classified MNF-I
dataset released to Wikileaks in 2010 that contains casualty-producing attacks on coalition
forces, Iraqi security forces and the civilian population. Although some academic research has
made use of this dataset (Donnay and Filimonov 2014), US government policy prohibits and
general academic consensus limits its general use (Defense 2011, O'Loughlin 2016). Pending
declassification, which has been requested to US Central Command by several individuals, this
research must wait. Despite these limitations, research using partial components of this dataset
shows promising results, with statistically significant relationships between increased levels
MND commanders’ levels of education correlating with a decrease in casualty-producing attacks
on coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and the civilian population.
Other leader attributes, such as command experience and number and type of
deployments are other officer traits that should be examined as explanatory variables to
determined relationships with effectiveness in combat. This data, easily accessible through US
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Army Human Resources Command (HRC) could be assessed both against both ESOC and a
declassified SIGACT data.
In conclusion, this work provides some initial quantitative research that examines the
effect of advanced US Army education on conflict. Much more must be done. Previous
historical research attributes US success in World War II to the US Army’s interwar (1919-1941)
focus on education. During this period “officers routinely spent one-half to two-thirds of their
careers as students or instructors” at military and civilian schools (Colarusso and Lyle 2014:3).
This, along with a revamped promotion system based upon performance, not time in service,
allowed the US Army “to find the leaders…not only [capable] of creating mighty armies…but of
leading and guiding those armies upon a scale incomparably greater than anything that was
prepared for (Larrabee 1987:120).
Today things are much different. Combat experience and assignment to operational units
are the most desired military attributes, with continuing education coming in last in priority
(Colarusso and Lyle 2014:4). The US Army itself acknowledged this in its Review of Education,
Training and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) study (2006:6) which stated:
…a culture exists in the Army in which officers aspire to the highest positions
of responsibility by selecting narrow career paths at the expense of
development in the skills needed in the non-kinetic spectrum…Often times the
current culture discourages experiences outside of the traditional career track.

Current military leadership has of late promoted the necessity of education, but has addressed
half of the problem; demanding only an increase in quantity, not quality. From 2016-2018, the
Chief of Staff of the Army has directed US Army assignment board members to ensure officers
were given enough time for completion of military Senior Service College (SSC). SSCs are
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military universities, including the Army War College, Air War College, and Naval War
College, that are established specifically to train senior military officers. Unfortunately the
education provided there is woefully inadequate for the modern complex era of conflict and
discusses little beyond military-centric subjects (Hodges Jr 2012, Cyrulik 2015).
Ultimately what is needed is the continued focus on quantity, but increased vigor toward
quality. At a minimum, military war college curriculum must be revitalized to be more
challenging, in-depth, and diversified. They should be expanding from a one to a two-year
program with enforced requirements for graduation, thus making them comparable to other
civilian programs. More effectively, the US military must crack the Athens versus Sparta
paradigm and reverse the downward spiral of advanced civilian school slot availability, making it
more commensurate with 1980 Cold War levels. US Army promotion and selection boards
should give more weight to education when selecting those for higher responsibility and combat
command.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This research provides initial support to the theory that some military institutional
tendencies and habits negatively affect US military officer forecasting accuracy. Furthermore,
poor forecasting inhibits success on the battlefield. Lastly, that increased education does have
some effect on the modern battlefield.
In chapter two, The Impact of Military Institutional Tendencies and Habits on
Forecasting, I examined the US Army as an institution, what tendencies and habits are promoted
within this institution, and what effect do these habits have on forecasting. Using survey data
collected from Colonels in US Army War College programs which measured their individual
tendencies, levels of education, and accuracy in forecasting events during a three to twelvemonth future, I found that some habits are present and negatively affect forecasting ability;
additionally, higher levels of education positively affect forecast accuracy, possibly
counteracting the effects of negative institutional tendencies and habits.
In chapter three, Senior General Officer Case Study, I extended chapter two’s research
through historical and contemporary case studies of senior US Army Generals, including General
McClellan in the American Civil War, General Omar Bradley in World War Two and General
David Petraeus during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Through these case studies, I confirmed that
rejection of these institutional habits and tendencies enabled superior forecasting, leading to
battlefield success.
Lastly, in Education and Success in Battle, I examined if higher levels of education
positively affect forecast accuracy, possibly counteracting the effects of negative institutional
tendencies and habits. Using quantitative analysis of data collected from the US Army historical
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archives I found that higher levels of education positively affected significant activities within
the general’s assigned areas, but did not definitively answer if education promotes success on the
battlefield; more research is needed.
In conclusion, this research serves as an impetus for additional research. Forecasting is
an important aspect of military and defense responsibilities, but programs specifically designed
to improve forecast accuracy improvement are not an acknowledged part of the US military’s
professional military education process. Additionally, since the 1996 implementation of the US
Army Officer Professional Management System XXI, the US military has significantly devalued
the importance of rigorous education, as identified in the Athens vs. Sparta crisis (Urben 2017),
for those officers destined for senior and strategic levels of command. Despite this, a likely
solution could be made available. Education opportunities, available both through civilian
graduate schooling and a more rigorous war college curriculum could lessen the effects of
negative military institutional tendencies and habits.
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APPENDIX A: FORECAST SURVEY QUESTIONS
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What is your US Army Rank?
What is your sex?
What is your duty status?
Did you a service transfer into the U.S. Army from another U.S. military branch of service
(U.S. Air force, Navy, Marine Corps) or the U.S. Coast Guard within the last 10 years?
Did you command at the O5 level?
How many total combat deployments have you completed (each longer than 7 months)?
Describe your level of education (4= Bachelors, 2= Masters, 3= PHD, MD other Doctoral)
Is your master's degree (if more than one, one of your master's degrees) in the same
discipline as your undergraduate degree?
How confident do you feel in correctly predicting international and national politicalmilitary events 12 to 18 months in the future?
What is your branch/functional area? (Select 1)
when in charge of a group developing a plan, you tend to: (1= directed COA, 2= consider
several COAs)
When faced with a problem, you tend to: (1= directed COA based on own experience, 2=
solicit others)
How do subordinates help you in a planning effort? (1= directed COA, 2= non-directed
COA)
"A single directed course of action (COA) during the military decision-making process
(MDMP)...." (1= directed COA can always be used, 2= directed COA should only be used
when necessary)
A fellow officer would describe you as: (1= dislike ambiguity, 2= can operate in ambiguity)
Which statement makes more sense to you? (1= confirm a plan, 2= invalidate a plan)
You have greater respect for a leader who is: (1= firm, sticks with plan, 2= scraps plan if
conditions change)
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How do you feel about the following statement: "When considering most disagreements, I
can usually see how both sides could be right."
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"It is important to consider dissenting opinions on a plan, especially from those who are
not close colleagues."
When faced with a complex and ambiguous situation, what is the likelihood that you will
seek an answer using published military doctrine?
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"A benefit of military doctrine is a consistency or general uniformity in solutions."
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"Published military doctrine is nothing more than a general guide; it can be ignored if the
situation calls for it."
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"We have spent too much time, money, and blood in Afghanistan to let it collapse."
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"Soldier deaths and money spent in war are unimportant. They should have zero impact on
our future options."
Does the loss of 3 Soldiers increase your determination to complete the mission now?
What is the likelihood of the following event occurring during fiscal year 20__?:
U.S. and Chinese military forces will clash in the South China Sea, resulting in US and/or
Chinese serviceman casualties
Great Britain will exit from the European Union
The U.S. will withdraw its military forces from Syria
North Korea will agree to an externally verified denuclearization plan
ISIS will perpetrate a large-scale (50 or greater) casualty-producing terrorist attack in the
US
Iran will violate the denuclearization Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) still in
place between Iran and the European Union (EU)
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Oil prices will rise by 10%
Macedonia meets conditions for future inclusion to NATO
Bashar al-Assad will step down or be overthrown as the president of Syria
Democrats will achieve a majority in the US Senate
A far-right candidate will secure the most votes in the first round of the Brazilian
presidential elections
US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita will increase by 5 or more percent
A cyberattack will result in a significant shutdown of critical infrastructure (electrical,
communication, water, transportation) shutdown for at least 24 hours
The US will remove the steel and aluminum tariffs currently imposed on Turkey
Draft legislation to create a US Space Command will be approved by the House or Senate
Armed Services Committee
Two or more US executive branch cabinet members will resign
The US trade deficit with China will decrease by 10%
SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, Boeing or Blue Origin will successfully complete a scheduled
civilian passenger spaceflight
US Army Security Force Assistance Brigade Two (SFAB-2) will deploy to Afghanistan
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